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The Civic Action Concept as an Instrument of U. S. Foreign Aid Policy
by Thomas P. Scott
U. S. Foreign Aid Policy has been the basis for extensive
political and scholarly debate for several yer . It has been in-
sinuated that this area of foreign policy has become uncontrollable,
and that the goals set forth in the field of foreign aid have become
unrealistic and /or unattainable.
The Civic Action concept has gained considerable renown in
recent years, especially since the adoption by the Communists of
the practice of unconventional warfare. Utilizing the stated purposes
of U. S. foreign aid, and developing a realistic policy within these
parameters, the writer has set forth a concept of Civic Action, and
how such approach would be beneficial to the United States in its
efforts to achieve the overall goals of foreign aid. A working
definition of Civic Action was rendered, certain problem areas were
investigated, and the feasibility ot' applying Civic ction where
possible was discussed.
The conclusion drawn are considered valid within the frame-
work of the writer's definition of a realistic foreign aid policy.
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••lems facing the merican pe pie t day, and the
Unit tes Government, are so filled with en. , half-truth,
misunderstanding, ignorance, and plain confusion as th
foreign aid policy. Yet there are few problems which may have such
immediate and long-range importance to the United States, for
the outcome of decisions in this vital area depends the future of this
nati
In the age of rapidly approaching nuclear stalemate, and with
the increasing realization by leaders ail over the world that political
objectives are less and less attainable by the traditional us*
physical
, the foreign policy instrument f f reign aid, both
military and economic, has become a primary element in the bags of
political. tools of competing statesmen. Faced with this unique mili-
tary phenomenon, and the added complexity of the international atmos-
phere brought about by the staunchly anti-democratic ideology of the
communist system, every instrument available to states in their
Iter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow, " The V ashington
Post, July 19, 1963. Mr. Lippmann, in an analysis of a recent
iet release concerning the Sino- Soviet ideological talks, related
the fact that one of the primary sources of the dispute between the
two communist powers has been the realisation of the dangers of
nuclear war by the Soviets, and the apparent corresponding lack of
concern on the part of the Chinese.

iv
efforts to achieve success in the foreign policy endeavors has grown
immensely in relative importance. Further added to the military and
ideological confr n; ation facing pclicy makers is the revolutionary ex-
plosion i the underdeveloped nations struggling for a better life,
usually earmarked by considerable, r even extreme impatience. This
so-called "revolution of rising expectations" must be reckoned with,
in no less considered fashion than the other problems which the nation
has encountered on the international scene, if for no other reason
than the fact that they are all so closely intertwined.
Charges leveled at the United States 1 foreign aid policy have
been both rational and irrational, well-founded and ill-founded, answer-
2
able and unanswerable. great number of the claims and-or charges
have been the result of differences of opinion concerning basic foreign
Ucy, and have not been adaptable to concise resolution regarding
what the policies and procedures in the foreign aid policy ought or ought
not to be. This inadequacy might be attributed to the fact that specific
objectives have not been delineated. (Ey specific is meant those
objectives other than general goals of survival, security, and peaceful
progress. ) certain vagueness is inherent in the problem, since
there is the further necessity for making such judgments as to the
2
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actual extent of United States vital inte rests, and what actually is
needed for the national security in relation to the international situation
at any given period-
There o clear-cut, universally applicable answers to the
problem of foreign aid. However, it may prove more advantageous
,1 the United States policy standpoint t ^ certain courses of
action in implementing the foreign aid program. U is the purpose of
this paper I ^e6tigate a phase of the program which has been receiv-
ing considerable attention and increased prominence among policy makers
recently. It has become known as Civic Action, and the investigation has
been made with the view toward assessing its political, military, soci: -
economic, and psychological utility as the possible connecting link in
the total aid effort in those areas where its application appears feasible.
It was considered appropriate to precede the discussion of this parti-
cular aspect with a conceptual analysis of foreign aid in general, so as
to establish with maximum perspicuity the writer's interpretation
the United States approach. fundamental base upon which the Civic
lion c ncept has been constructed has also been provided by this
preliminary analysis.
ne factors which the writer feels add to the potential of the
Civic Action concept are:
1. An increased pressure within the United States for greater

vi
economy, and lets overall expenditure in assistance programs.
2. The need for the development of basic skills and oth
essentials, such as power, roads, communications facilities in the
underdeveloped countries before any real progress can be made on
a larger economic level.
3. ith regard tti -> , above, th wing realization among
donors that the "pitch" of the present economic development programs
may be aimed above the level of the self-help capabilities of the
underdeveloped nations.
4. The need for the development of a stronger feeling
national unity within these countries, and the possible utility of a
national institution- -the military- -in the nurturing of such a spirit.
5. The need for some effort i ing living conditions and
public health and safety during that precarious transition period from
initial disturbance to 'take-off
6. The present nature of the threat of internal subversion in
the underdeveloped areas of the world.
Several factors which must be borne in mind when discussing
or analyzing the problem of foreign aid policy are worthy of mention
at the outset. These ar
1. There is an inherent misleading factor in this area when




2. It must ba realized that the United States, ae a democratic
society with American peculiarities, imposes very real limitations on
the policy maker and the methods he may choose to implement a
foreign aid policy. These limitations are accepted by choice, and by
this is inferred the existence of an additional source of misunder-
standing and disagreement, since the degree of compromise or surrender
of these values is a matter of personal judgment.
3. Foreign aid is but one instrument available to the United
States in the field of foreign policy. To attempt to substitute foreign
aid in an area which is lacking in a sound foreign policy is to discredit
aid and lead to its ultimate rejection by the American people.
quoted passage from the Interim Report of the President's Committee
to Study the United State. ssistance Program, the Draper
Committee, in 1959, reflected that possibility:
In our fascination with our own mistakes, and the
nstant use of foreign aid for a whipping boy, we may
be gradually choking this vital feature of our national
security policy to death. *
4. Civic n, in terms of reference which are satisfied
The Presidents Committee to Study the United States ilitary
Assistance Program, Interim Report ( v.ashington: The Draper





when applying it as defined herein, is but one segment of th Ign
aid program, and must be viewed in that perspective. It would
serve no purpose to assert that Civic Action programs could or
should replace other types of primarily military defense assistance
where the obstacles to such implementation are obvious.
.
CHAPTER I
U. S. PHILOSOPHY IN THE IN?
The National latere it
It is the /merican interest to maintain a world environ-
ment for the United States within which /merican society
can continue to develop in conformity with the humanistic
tendencies which are at its foundation. *
This definition, as set forth by Professor . . Hostow,
has expressed succinctly the concept of the United States national
interest. It was meant to include the physical protect! the
mtry, according to Mr. Rostow, but was not specifically stated
because it was considered to be "... a means to a larger end--
2
the protection of a still developing way of life. "
A treatment of the question f national interest was con-
sidered necessary because it has been acknowledged to be the focal
point about which the activities of states in their international re-
lations evolves. It has motivated states to follow specified courses
of action, even in instances whan alternative actions, in the vi«w of
. Rostow, The United States in the V orld Arona (New




other states, would be deemed more appropriate. Ai change occurs
in the world environment, a nation is faced with the task of assessing
that change with respect to its own national interests, and it must
choose a course of action (no action being a possible choice) based
on an estimation of a situation.
It has been decided that the occupation of the Eurasian land
mass by any one power or coalition of powers hostile to this nation
would not be in the national interest, it has likewise been determined
contrary to the national interest to permit the development of a
world environment in which basically democratic societies would not
3be p _cd to grow. The nation's stake in the world in an ideol-
ogical sense has proved to be just as real as that of a political, or
of a military nature.
In the modern era of mass communications the nations of the
globe have become more closely associated, and the merican
national interest has taken on a global dimension. In essence, the
judgment has been made to the effect that there is no area of the
world where military, political, economic, or psychological change
might occur which will not in some manner or degree, favorably or
adversely, involve the national interest of the United States.
Ibid .
, p. 547. See also, U. egress ate, The
Special nittee ody the Foreign Aid Program, Foreign *id
gram, Compilation of Studies and Surveys, Document no. 52,
SSth >ng. , 1st sss. , Jul/, 1957, pp. 16*20, fort fundamental
discuss the merican national interest.

The Nature of the Threat
There are two ways of looking at the world today. One is to
view external happenings with an eye toward the resultant effect
these may have on United States interests and security. Such a view
lires the knowledge of what the interests of the country are, and
how conditions can best be shaped to maximize the possibility of
satisfying those interests. It requires an accurate assessment
the summation of forces acting on the international scene, and a
knowledge of the likely effect they will have on the nation-state system,
and in particular on the United States as a component of that system.
This is a viewpoint which portrays the national self-interest primarily.
It requires an effort toward manipulating the summation of forces in
such a way that the security of the United States will be maximized
to the extent possible. Hies are sought to provide as strong a de-
fense as possible against any aggressive acts of a potentially host
nation, or group of nations. This accumulation ,ver, at the same
time, has the reverse effect of minimising the security of an adversary.
The matter of security, then, is relative in nature. No position can
be considered to be absolutely secure, except perhaps a "Pax-
Americana, " which is not a situation the United States is aspiring
to create.
'ier way in which the world may be viewed is that United

tea interests and security are directly dependent upon the
creation o£ some system of world order which would be compatible
with continued development of the United States as the kind of nation
it is, and is desirous of becoming. This viewpoint is twofold in
nature in that it adds a constructive element to the defensive one of
4
merely lining up and attempting to contain opposing forces.
The rapid advance of the age of mass communication, modern
science and technology, coupled with a parallel rise in the national-
istic spirit of the emerging nations, the demise of colonialism (with
an attendant growth of an anti -colonialist ideology), and the drive for
modernization has brought about a condition of change upon the nation-
state system which is so dynamic that it virtually defies classifi-
cation as an ordered system. The complexity of the international
situation has been further Increased by the economic, military, poii-
5
tical, and ideological challenge of the communist bloc nations, led
by the only other major nuclear power, the Soviet Union. This latter
4
Paul H. Nitae, "United States Policy and Foreign Aid, "
al Heport International Stability and gress , 1 r Force
demy Assembly, United ftates Air Force Academy, (April 1-4,
1959), pp. 17-34,
5
Jay H. Cerf and alter Fozen, ftrategy for the 60 's (New
York: F. . x'raeger, 1961), pp. i-28. The authors summarized
13 special foreign policy studies made in 1959-60, and listed the
major challenges to the United States as (1) the role of the emerging
nations; (2) the Sino-Soviet threat; and (3) the destructive power of
thermonuclear weapons and the increasing number of nations
possessing them.

5phenomenon, and its balancing effect in the nuclear power reiatio
ship between Hast and vest, has contributed to the increased imp
tance of the underdeveloped world. These nations have been thrust
into the limelight in the struggle, which has caused act
capriciously in the conduct of their domestic and foreign affairs. In
their drive to achieve a position abreast of the more industrialized
nations of the world, the emerging states have mounted the "fence" in
an effort to hasten the realisation of their national ambitions. In
other cases, where neutralism and noncommitment have not been the
chosen policies, these nations have increased considerably the nature
6
of their requests, and demands. They are faced with the general
problems of assembling their resources and organising their national-
istic fervor in such a way that will permit them to operate effectively
as a sovereign state on the international scene, and to achieve
7
economic progress at home. The problem itself is not new, but the
setting in which it has been placed has provided a new focus.
The economic distress of the underdeveloped countries
is centuries old; what is new is that the impact of the est
has given their discontent a 'political* focus. They want to
telescope into a few years the progress that took us gener-
ations to accomplish. In short, they have got their steam
John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign ow
York: F. . Praeger, for The Council on Foreign Relations 1962),
p. 244.
7,
. .rtastow, op. cit. , p. 430.

up and are ready Can try to block their advance;
we can stand aside; or we can ride with them and help steer.
The first course would be foolhearty if not futile; the second,
short-sighted; the last is in our national interest.
The excitement has been heightened by the entry of th xet
Union into these areas in their "competitive" role with a "trade and
9
aid" policy designed to further their own interests. Their aims have
appeared to be threefold. They have been designed to break up the
estern Alliance system, decrease the level stern influence in
the underdeveloped areas, and to enhance their own position in these
rrest D. Iviurden, Underdevel ;ped Landg luti.;n of
Rising xpectati^ns ' (New York: y ssociati gn
ries No. 1 19. 1956), p. 4.
Q
Hans J. a rgenthau, ' h Hestorati -n of litics
(Chicago: University of CTiicago Press, 1962), pp. 250.
Morgenthau related that the latest Soviet interest concerning the
struggle against capitalism" . . . has left the arsist- Leninist
theory that the fall of capitalism will come about as the result of a
series rid wars. His [jKhrushchev'sJ theory purports to prove
that the United .States will fall as a result of being outstripped econ-
omically by the Russian, or Communist system. He says capitalism
is irdi nomic organisation and productivity. ;^s he put it
to the noted newspaper columnist and author, 'alter lippmann,
America enjoys 'the last years of greatness. ' Th . Let Union is
destined to surpass the United States in economic productivity and
well-being; and by demonstrating its economic superiority over the
United States, it will set an example which the underdeveloped masses
of the earth will want to emulate. They will choose the Soviet rather
than the American way of life. Furthermore, this economic super-
-Lty will enable the Soviet Union to wage full-scale economic war
against the Unitec I by taking away its foreign markets and
integrating the underdeveloped areas of the world into its •<
and political system. Thus, without firing a shot, the Soviet Union
will triumph over the United States.

10
area* insofar as possible* The shift in Soviet strategy from the
military to the mic front can be understood in light of the in-
calculable risks involved in such methods as direct aggression to
gain control. The possibility of engaging in a direct conflict with
the United States, and its nuclear power, through the escalation of
iflict has had an inhibiting effect on the Soviets, and has
lessened the chance that they would start another Korea. This in-
hibitive factor may not apply in the case of Communist China,
although they have appeared hesitant in instances where a direct
citation has been likely. It has also been suggested that the
success realized in the United States military assistance programs
12
may have contributed to the Soviet policy shift.
Joseph S. Berliner, soviet '. con :mic Aid (New York: F.
Praeger, 1958), pp. 15ff.
11 James I mmett Garvey, Marxist- Leninist China: Military
and Social Doctrine (New York: Exposition Press, 1960), Ch. 7.
Dr. Garvey emphasized the "privileged" position the United States
has occupied in the Chinese efforts to realise success in their re*
volution. The United States has constantly been the primary
antagonist in the Chinese attempt to resolve the contradictions in
their own system, and in their attempts to extend that system in
other areas.
12
The Presidents Committee to Study the United States
LUtary Aesistanf gram, Supplement to the Composite Report
(Vol. H), August, 1959, p. 69. This conclusion was reached in the
process of analyzing the increasing emphasis of the t
grams on economic penetration, and the associated concen n
by many experts in the United States regarding the specific
military assistance in the underdeveloped areas.

aThe Proxy V ars
The expansionist policy of the Soviet Union has continued since
the advent of nuclear weapons, but :>n a different level. They have
resorted to exploiting discontent and instability wherever it has been
13
found. The technique has been labelled "Proxy V ars. " The
advantage of this approach has become apparent when considering
the legalistic concepts ol the est, and the associated theory of
"aggression. "
Chairman Khrushchev has stated that:
The theory of so-called local or minor wars with the
use of mass destruction weapons has sprung up in the
st I The theory of limited nuclear war]] • ith such
wars the imperialists want to suppress the national liber-
ation movement and do away with governments which do
not suit them. Yet we must not think that under present
iditions minor wars would be localized. Should such
14
wars break out, they c utd soon grow into a world war. "
If the above statement can be referred to as a rejection by
the Soviets of the theory of limited nuclear war, then it could be
assumed that th iict has been pitched at a still lower level
competition- -that of subersion, infiltration, guerrilla warfare
the all-inclusive th ?y of the national liberation movement.
Mr. Khrushchev further expounded on his strategy of peaceful
N. H. Mager and Jacques Katel (eds. ), Conquest





coexistence in a report given at a meeting of leading Soviet the -
reticians and propagandists. He declared that:
^The policies of peaceful coexistence and disarmamentj
be used as primary weapons to bring about the final defeat
capitalist 'imperialism* and the establishment
communism throughout the world. . . . £Ve are_J
supporters of all such national liberation movements
wherein the popular masses are fighting against colonial
rulers or against capitalist governments. ^
It has become apparent since 1961 that this strategy has, in
fact, been adopted by the Soviet Union in the pursuit of its national
objectives. The United States, as leader of the free world community,
has been directing its efforts to meet these challenges. Less com-
forting, however, has t.en the realization that the Soviets have been
left with the option of shifting their strategy. Their ability to select
the competition has required the V est to maintain an impressive
conventional and military force for deterrent and defensive purposes.
The Chinese C ommunists, in asserting their independence from the
viets, have added the need for military strength, since they have
17
sh'.'wn themselves to be quite ready to resort to active belligerency.
15
New York Times, January 19, 196 i.
The President's Committee, Composite Report, p. 147.
17
U. S. Congress, House, Committee -med Services,
; xry Posture, Hearings bef vmittee on H. K. 2440, 88th
g. , 1st Sess. , January 30, 1963 ( Washington: Government
Printing Cffice, 1963), pp. 288-290.

10
cretary of Defense amara categorized the nature of
the threat by using various groups of nations as determinants:
(1) Those who in the main fa. / the threat of
internal aggress ion- -the now familiar pattern of penetra-
tion, infiltration, subversion, dissidence and guerrilla
warfare; (2) those who face the threat of direct military
aggression in addition to international aggression; and (3)
the special situation in he N^TO area. re
The international situation has been studied, and the need f
a foreign aid program as a foreign policy instrument has been realized.
How it should be utilized to produce the best results has not been
universally agreed upon. Considerable difference of opinion has
arisen among academicians, politicians, and the citizenry regarding
the. matter, and the succeeding chapter has been devoted to that
pr ^blem.
18
U. 8. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign "ffairs,
The International Development and Security ^ct. Hearings before
Committee on H. 72, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. , June 8, 1961
( ashington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Part I, p. 69.

a u
TI-J II N " NCEPT(S) FOREIGN aid
Various writings in the field of foreign aid have revealed several
factors which are common to all, generally, but with different parti-
cular approaches. They fell within three basic classifications of (1)
economic, (2) political, and (3) humanitarian. There have also been
a sufficient number who have opposed the concept of foreign aid. For
that reason a representative view of a dissenting voice has been
presented. No distinct separation could be discerned in every case,
nor have dissenting elements condemned the entire program in every
respect. The concept of foreign aid has contained so many inter-
relating factors that precise division has proved practically impossible.
The economic approach has revealed proposals which most
.Americans would like to see in operation. The political approach
contained factors which have related to the international situation as
it has usually existed. The humanitarian approach contained a basis
for an operation as it probably ought to be, and in the negative approach
James . iggins and Helmut ck, (eds. ), Foreign
Reexamined (Washington: Public Affairs Iress, 1958), p. i, wherein
it was stated that "The foreign aid programs f the United States owe
their existence to humanitarian, economic, and political motives. '
W*U ttX-'
12
could be found objections base -ny number of conditions. It
should be remembered that humanitarian principles, while providing
funds, have not always coincided with political objectives; and that
national security gains have been more illustrative in military
alliance terms than in long-range, little evidenced economic develop-
ment conditions. V.hat has been most often encountered in the field
of foreign aid has been an economist in a political post, defending the
foreign aid program on essentially humanitarian principles.
In order to provide a basis for further analysis, a summary
view of representative proponents in each of the above classifications
has been considered appropriate.
The Economic Approach
, vlUikan an<: . Hostow, in their boo? reposal :
2
Key to an Effective Foreign Policy, have incorporated a majority of
the proposals which have been considered representative of the
economic approach. The authors asked several basic questions con-
cerning American foreign aid policy, and attempted to analyse them
2
Max F. Llillikan and , . Rostov Proposal: Key to an
It.Ifec.tivv oreign i-olicy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957).
3
See also, U.S. Congress, Senate, The Special Committee to
Study the Foreign / id Program, Foreign /id Program,
of Studic surveys, Document No. 52, 85th Cong. , 1st Sess. , July,
1957, Study No. 3, "The Role of Foreign Aid in the Development of
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13
with respect to what had been done tn the past and what the policy
should b< , 1 could, they contended, provide an effective instru-
ment for producing political, social, and psychological results which
would be in the national interest of the United States. This reason-
ing was that the American goals of survival and long life would
nuture such conditions that would permit this to happen. They saw
the need for a policy change from one of a negative to a positive
nature, because to be against something--communism- -did not always
meet with understanding among the underdeveloped countries. The
errors of expecting gratitude and insisting on stereotypes were also
pointed out. It was recommended that the United States approach the
foreign aid program in a cold, business-like manner, giving it the
profit and loss test--notin terms of money spent, friends won or lost,
or United States versus communist wins or losses, but in terms
viable, stable societies capable of effecting change in a peaceful way.
The sole obligation of the United States, according to illikan and
Rostow, would be to provide these nations with a choice, and that
the choice in the end was theirs to make.
To offset the "fair share" approach which the authors felt
was being used by the United States, they recommended a "staging"
concept which was designed to establish measurable criteria for re-
ceiving economic assistance. The three stages--preconditi*ming.

14
take-off, and self-sustaining- -would eliminate the. allocation of funds
4
on equity or political grounds.
It was recommended that the United States embark upon a long-
term aid effort as soon as possible, with further assurance that there
would be sufficient capital to meet the needs of the program,
effort should also be made to enlist the help of the other developed
countries in this undertaking. There should be no military or politi-
cal strings attached to the acceptance of aid, but simply a strict
5
business-type atmosphe^
I ^-ordinating body should be established, they felt, which
could be used for setting up the ground ruler securing acceptance
of the criteria for assistance. This body should be an international
one if it could be established without detracting from th ft-
tinuity of the program.
4For a detailed descriptive treatment of the economic transitions
an- obstacles which often create tensions and lead to political in-
stability, see . i Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: / Non-
Communist ..anifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I960).
alter F. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds. ), .American Strategy
for the Nuclear *ge (New York: Doubleday & Co., I960), pp. 375-387.
Dr. Arnold s, in his article, M ilitary or Economic Assistance:
stions of Priority, " has presented an interesting query concern!
the interim period. He stated that "Victory in this competition may
come long before the long-run projects are completed, and in fact in-




The illikan- Rostow plan, generally representative of the
6
economic approach to foreign aid, was not, according to the authors,
a matter erf sacrifice or strain economically, but a matter of will.
Regarding this aspect, President Kennedy, in his message to Congress
on -April 2, 1963, concerning foreign aid, said:
The United States today is spending over 10 per cent
of its Gross National Product on programs primarily aimed
at improving our national security. Somewhat less than
l/20th of this amount, and less than 0. 7 per cent of our
goes into the mutual assistance program: roughly half for
economic development, and half for military and other short-
term assistance. The richest nation in the world would surely
be justified in spending less than 1 per cent of its national in-
come on assistance to its less fortunate sister nations solely
as a matter of international responsibility. ...
The Political Approach
Representative proponents of the political approach, or concept,
of foreign aid have been Messrs. . orgenthau and Liska.
*Max F. MUUkan, "New and Id Criteria for Foreign in
Thomas P. Peardon (ed. ), The New Look in Foreign /id (New York:
Columbia U. Press, 1962), pp. 28-49. r. ; illikan 's article has
presented an updated version of his proposals, and has given consider-
ation for political realities concerning foreign aid. He mi ich
statements as ". . . of course, the application of the test must include
an evaluation of intangible factors. For example, conspicuous projects
can strengthen national pride and unity and thereby increase fk
willingness of the people to make sacrifices that are necessary for
rapid growth. , . . si ". . . ;*gain, there is considerable agr
ment among experts on the nature of the devices required, although a
judgement as to whether the effort is adequate must always, in the
last analysis, involve a political estimate.
Text of the President's VIesftage to Congress or -d,
The ashington Post , April 3, 1963.
n
16
Hans k.orgenthau, in an article in The American Political
8
Science Review in June, 1962, outlined a realistic, political approach
to the problems of foreign aid. His argument was not concerned with
foreign aid as a policy tool. That was accepted as a matter of fact.
He considered foreign aid to be an indispensible means of getting
things done in instances where others --diplomacy, for example, in
and of itself--could not, or where extreme methods such as armed
force could not be justified. The major concern has been with the
amount of money spent, and not the substance of the purpose of aid,
and how it best serves American interests. The purpose, as sug^sted
by My, Morgenthau, should be to ensure survival and promote peace-
9
ful progress. The United States policy has been "weak, " and has
only accidentally been related to the political purposes of American
foreign policy, h« rted.
He classified foreign aid in six basic categories, as (1)
humanitarian, (?.) subsistence, (3) military, (4) bribery, (5) prestige,
and (6) ec Lc development assistance. C>nly humanitarian
assistance could be legitimately considered non-political aid, and
then it would depend on the circumstances under which it was proffered.
"Hans J. ^enthau, "A Political Theory of Forei£
The American Political Science Review , LVT, (June, 1962), p. 301-
310.
Q7 The identity of purpose in aid policy can be noted between the
political and economic theorists in their otherwise different approaches
to foreign aid. See p. 13, above.
,!' r.
17
/eating phenomenon was developed regarding past
practices of rendering aid to a country for a purpose other than as
openly agreed. A bribe, for example, might be given to a country
in the guise of economic development assistance, or jet planes given
under the pretext of military assistance when they are nothing more
than prestige items, and of questionable utility to the recipient.
Such activities have been referred to as "cross-purposing" foreign
aid. This tendency has led to considerable ambiguity, loss of
effectiveness of foreign aid, and widespread criticism of the pro-
gram by the Congress and the American people.
jenthau expressed a concern for the developing
climate of opinion in the country which has embraced the notion that
economic development can be promoted simply by the transfer of
goods and services alone. He referred to this misconception as
"playacting" which could only lead to ultimate disenchantment by all
involved. Advantages have been lost by the donor, and a clear dis-
tinction ( purpose has not been possible. The United States as
donor nation has not always been able to justify aid in such cases,
and when that has occurred, often tunes political advantages have
been forfeited.
He proposed that the economists have been working under a
basically wrong assumption about foreign aid in that they have ignored

18
the fact that ail the aid in the world could not transform some
societies suffering from natural and social deficiencies. He drew an
analogy between bums and beggars within a national society and bum
and beggar nations within the international community. Aid itself
would not change cultural beliefs, or cause land reform, or provide
sufficient relief where the basic rudiments of savings for capital
formation were not in evidence. Success would rely not on economic
theories alone, but on political, moral, and social preconditions
which, if non-existent, could not be readily inculcated in societies
from external sources.
Th* jenthau plea called for a country by country program
guided principally by the careful selection of country experts. He
believed the economist, like the general, has a place in the overall
aid effort, but he should not be relied upon to devise policy.
The Liska s ch, while similar in the political vein, con-
tained a marked difference in the manner of aid classification. In
10
his book, ..' Nfew Lecraft, ~. Liska placed foreign aid under
two general headings. These were simply acquisitive and creative
aid. Briefly stated, acquisitive ^id would be that proffered
Georg . .iska, A New Statecraft; Foreign 'id in




political purposes specifically* and creative aid would have as its
primary objective the assistance of states in their efforts toward
economic development. This latter form of aid would probably un-
avoidably carry secondarily political implications
.
11
He surmised that if power is the core of politics, th
control is the manifestation of both power and politics. In order
to achieve genuine co-operation in the field of foreign aid, there
must be a balance of reciprocal control established between the
donor and the recipient. The aspects of control should be one of
cptimacy, and not maximum control by either party. To strive i
a position of maximum control would be unrealistic, except in in-
stances where the recipient had no alternatives whatever, or where
it happened to be immvine to negative prestige. Situations vary, and
each would have to be examined in terms of serving the ultimate
objective of American and free world securi
r. Liska'a central plea was for the achievement of a sense
of long-run consistency, and short-run flexibility in United States
foreign aid policy. To do this, he saw the need for a more highly
sophisticated degree of statecraft on the part of those in the areas
Bertrand Russell, Power (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1962),
p. 9. nPower . . , " said Lord Russell, nis the fundamental concept
in social science. " He sees power in many forms, such as wealth,
armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion.
':
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of responsibility. From a non-committed nation, he felt the United
States should demand a similar degree on non-commitment. (India
and Pakistan have served as good examples of "predicament pro-
ducers " in this regard. ) Ihore should be a continuous effort made
to remain non-involved and non-identified with those governments
which have not been in consonance with rican objectives and
ideals, but who may qualify for political assistance for strategic
reasons. Non-involvement and non-identification should not be con-
strued to mean the complete surrendering of control over aid, or the
termination of aid in every case where the recipients are not political
and/or military allies. uite the contrary, according to Mr. Liska.
I in a sense should function in a manner not unlike diplomatic
recognition. It should not, by the mere fact that it has been given,
connote moral approval of the recipient government involved.
Foreign aid, as conceived by the political proponents, evidenced
in the above examples, has been viewed as a useful tool in the con-
duct of United States foreign policy. Economic development as an
end in itself, has not been the main concern of this school of thought.
They have shown particular concern for the way in which the United
States has become involved in an indiscriminate doling out el funds
with no apparent pattern of consistency or sense of direction, there-




Universal humanitarian values--freedom from hunger, sick-
ness, and poverty--has pervaded United States foreign aid policy
thinking at virtually every level. Americans have generally shown
a feeling of moral obligation to the less fortunate peoples of the
12
world. This approach has been adequately expressed through state-
ments by President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk. The
President, in his Inaugural Address in January, 1961, said:
To those people in the huts and villages of half the
globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we
pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, f
whatever period is required- -not because the Communists
are doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because
it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are
poor, it cannot save the few who are rich. ^
Secretary Rusk, in a statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committees during the hearings on the proposed new for-
eign aid legislation in 1961, stated the matter quite eloquently:
12
In Viggins and Schoeck (eds. ), op. <:it. , pp. 2-3,
fessor Rippy recorded some caustic observations in his con-
tribution on "Compulsory Benevolence. " He observed that ". . .
clergymen have supported these programs with a zeal so constant
that one wonders whether church leaders ever advocated separation
of church and state with any other motive than that of religious
toleration and whether their vigorous support of these programs will
compel Ci ntribute to global charity fron now until judge-
ment day. . . . reaver, the public officials of the United States
have adopted the views of the religious and humanitarian groups. "
13 John 7. anedy, Inaugural Address , January 20, 1961,
excerpt cited in United States Government, Department e,
The :tor; ashington: AID, 1961).
.•
But this competition or national self-interest is not
the essence of the program we are discussing. ed no
other reason to support these measures than the profound
and overriding fact that they are right.
It is right to do these things because peoples are in
need of help an re able to help them to help them-
selves; because their children sicken and die while we have
the science to save them; because they are illiterate while
we have the means of education and knowledge; because their
agricultural methods and tools win them an annual income of
$50 from the soil while we have the capital and technical
skill to help them live like human beings.
Nor is there assurance that this aid will save the under-
developed world. But those who opposed foreign aid must
accept the consequences of their opposition. They must
understand that, if they succeed, they deny the people in the
emergent societies their last great hope for independent
development and theref ndemn them to th pf -
babili .*munist servitude--and us to ( mist
world encirclement.
These programs of aid in th- past 15 years, economic
and military, have cost a great deal of money and deserve
our thoughtful and critical reflection. The sums amount
approximately 1.5 per cent of our Gross National Product
during that period. e can never know, fortunately, what
our costs—or our fate--rnight have been otherwise, for
history does not reveal its alternatives. K we have not
accomplished all that we had hoped, perhaps our hopes were
sanguine, our understanding of this turbulent epoch too
limited, v hat has been achieved is a great deal--an oppor-
tunity for a free people, associated with friends and allies
in all parts of the world, to continue the effort to build a
decent world order. ^
^United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, International Development and Fecurity, hearings be-
fore Committee, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. , on S. 1983, L, 1961
( ashin; , 1961), 2 Parts, pp. 32-
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jle number of Americans the entire foreign aid e£f
has been looked upon as nothing more than a giant "giveaway j>
15
gram. " Many object to certain segments of the foreign aid program,
reflecting generally specific spheres of discontent. However, there
has been considerably strong apposition developing since I960, and
earlier, whose concern has been for the general health of the nation,
or from a deep conviction that foreign aid, in certain instances, has
worked contrary to the national interests of the nation.
Congressman Otto F. Passman (D-La), Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, has been
characterized by observers of the Congressional process as ". . . the
16
most powerful Congressional antagonist of Foreign id. " r.
Passman, in a recent interview with reporters from The New York
Times , said ". . . it has been, in my opinion, one of the greatest
17
foreign policy failures in history. ..." He gave four basic reasons
why he felt the foreign aid program of the United States was wrong.
U. F. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign affairs.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Hearings before Committee, 88th Cong*
1st Sess., on H. R. 5490, April 23-25, and 29. 1963, Part IL
representative statement, not unlike many others made throughout the
hearings was uttered by Congressman H. 3. Gross (R-Iowa), to General
Clay who was appearing before the Committee: "We have about reached
the end of the string as far as policing and wet-nursing the rest of tl_
world is concerned. " Part II, pp. 302-303.




1. Foreign aid has undermined the dollar. Mr. Passman
pointed to the fact that the United States has given aid to approxi-
mately 104 countries, at the cost of $120 billion, interest included.
He insisted that foreign aid spending has been at the root of the
American balance of payments problem, and that it has placed the
country in a financially unhealthy position.
2. Foreign aid has made the dollar a symbol of international
charity. The Congressman criticized the '¥act" that a belief of moral
responsibility has been inculcated in the less -favored nations. The
majority of the recipients have also carried less of a tax burden
than the . . taxpayer, he asserted.
3. The aid program has not only become an added tax on United
States producers, but also a subsidy to foreign competitors. This has
come about as a result of higher prices for American goods on the
world market, caused largely by the nation's wasteful giving, which
has rapidly depleted its wealth and resources.
4. Despite the tremendous aid expenditures and commitments,
the United States position in the world has remained a precarious one.
This nation became great because it had a fair foreign policy based
substantially on trade. Today, through foreign aid, the United States




The Congressman acknowledged the fact that the program could
not be realistically terminated abruptly in light of current international
conditions; but he felt it his duty to minimize and curtail as much of
the waste and mismanagement as would be possible under the cireum-
18
stances.
ier arguments, of varying degree and kind, fell somewhere
within the above categories, and further elaboration would be
19
repetitious.
Summary— . Realistic Foreign id Policy
The following summary has been set forth for two reasons
primarily.
1. Aa attempt has been made to present United States foreign
aid policy as it has developed, exists today, and as it is likely to
function in the foreseeable future.
2. By relating the writer's interpretation of 1. , above, a
foundation for the establishment of a Civic Action concept has hope-
fully been developed. Such a foundation was thought necessary so
Ibid. The reasoning behind Mr. Fassman's objections to the
foreign aid program were spelled out explicitly, and has not been the
result of the writer's interpretati the article.
19
See also, James iggins and Helmut Schoeck (eds. ), loc .
cit. ; illiam J. Lederer and Eugene L. Burdick, The Ugly
(New York: . . Norton & Company, 1958); and Eugene WP, Castle,
Billions, Blunders, and Baloney (New York: Devin Adair Co., 1955).
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that practical ground rules could be delimited for testing the
applicability of the Civic ,' ction concept with regard to functional
effectiveness.
uch confusion and fustrat \cerning United States foreign
aid policy has resulted from an attempt to operate the program in
20
contradiction to past experience and the lessons of history. The
primary purpose of the program has been to arrest the advances of
communism, and to preserve the international peace. The United
Spates approach to the problem of spreading communism has been to
bolster governments and regimes of an anti-communist nature
those areas where the threat has emerged, and thout good
reason. It would be of negative value in terms of American national
interests to permit a nation threatened with communist take-over to
sue urn i result of its inability to resist. That such a nati
methods of government have been of a questionable nature when
compared to democratic principles, must be relegated to a position
secondary to its national survival. In the long run, other methods
may be brought to bear on the situation in an effort to engender the
adoption f democratic principles in government.
This nation has also operated (generally) under the principle
20
•se close, "Diplomacy of Altruism, ,! in Aiggins and
'seek (eds. ), op . cit. , p. 34.
f .
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of national sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs
of others. Th cination of these factors has placed the United
States in the dubious position, in many areas, of appearing to support
the "status quo. " It has been most notable in those countries where
the regime or government in power has opposed change, and has be-
come immune to pressure {if not immune, at least physically capable
of resisting internal demands for change). This condition has existed
and should be acknowledged, not solely in a way of criticism, but
more so in the light of political realities as they prevail in con-
temporary international relations. These situations must also be
considered in the proper perspective with regard to feasible alter-
natives, realising that the United States government, by its very pre-
sence or absence, may incite internal revolt in a troubled nation but
cannot control such upheavals from an external position.
The relations between the United States and other nations has
been, and will likely continue to be, on a government-to-government
basis. By that is meant that the United States has not adopted the
practice, common among the communist countries, of working
21
achieve political objectives through selecte ous groups.
tx Thomas Loeber, Foreign Hd: Our Tragic Experiment (New
York:
. .
rton & Company, 1961), pp. 83ff. r. Loeber, a
former field worker under the old IC A organization, has delivered a
scathing attack on United States foreign aid policy and program




e disadvantages Inherent in this legalistic approach have become
obvious, especially in those states where the need for change has
existed, but the government has been sue si in resisting it.
itruism has long been a factor in United States foreign aid pol-
icy. While it has not been a primary one in the final analysis of the
various programs, it has proved to be too significant a factor to be
completely rejected in the designs of a realistic approach, it has pr -
duced a measure of the dichotomy in American policy, in that the policy-
makers have relied heavily on the attractiveness of humanitarian
principles in their efforts to enlist the greatest amount of support
possible for foreign aid programs. The proponents of foreign aid have
found that humanitarian interests, the national conscience, has probably
resulted in the most effective natural foreign aid lobby ever to have
functioned in the government. This influence will undoubtedly be felt
so long as a foreign aid program is kept in existent . nly consider-
ations of the direct national interest have prevailed over this factor;
and the two hav come so enmeshed that their separation would
seem unlikely.
A sizable portion of the United States foreign aid to the underc
22
oped nations in recent years has been in the form of military assistance.
22
U. . ngress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Staff
unorandum, Foreign Assistance Authorizations and Appropriations
for Fiscal Years and 1963 , 87th ,, 2d Sess. , 26 October, 1962
{"Washington: I iovermnent Printing Office, 1962), p. 2. In 1962, 1-6 >f
3.92 billion was for military assistance; and in 1963 1. 33 of 3.93 billion.
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The amount of military assistance given to these countries has been
determined through an intricate process of force level and defense
analysis, and in a number of instances, represents the largest ec -
ment of foreign assistance from the United States to these countries.
The military significance of aid given in the past was felt to be of
such importance that it has been suggested that the Mutual Security
Program prior to 1961 was purposely designed and presented in its
selected format in order to maximize the amounts appropriated by
23
Congress. ior to the installation of the present administration in
office, the shift to economic assistance programs could be discerned,
and a persistent, ever-increasing pressure in this direction has been
24
in evidence.
: jtter to the President from eight members of i~ ate
Foreign Relations Committee, August 25, 1958, as cited in The
President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance
Program, Composit. rt, (Reference Attachment), pp. 185-86.
The letter from the Senators stated that 'Vhile we know you have had
considerations of this kind in mind in preparing annual presentations
of the Mutual Security Program, we believe that there may have been
a tendency to believe that Congress blindly supports military assist-
ance but looks with disfavor on economic assistance. . . . ,;
, p. 186.
24
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
The Mutual Security ct of i960 , Report of Committee or . ;58
86th Cong., 2ndSess., Report No. 1286, April 22, i960 (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, i960), pp. 4-5. filing on
military assistance to Latin America was imposed for the first time
by the Congress. Initially, it was set at $55 million, and as reported
by the Committee, it ". . . would have been disposed to make an
even larger reduction except for the fact . . . '__of_j prior commit-
ments. ", p. 5.
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As the possibility of a serious rift between the two leading
communist powers has increased, and the chance for some form of
agreement between Russia and the est has become less remote,
the tendency to exercise even greater scrutiny over military assist-
ance will have gained considerable support in the United States. The
dissatisfaction among many members of the government, particularly
the Congress, over the apparent refusal of the NATO countries to
increase their defense expenditures to what the United States has
considered minimal, cannot but add to the determination to decrease
American defense assistance.
The effect of military assistance in many areas has been as
much a psychological factor as it has physically defensive. Any
serious "reappraisals" of future programs, if they are to assist in
the achievement of foreign policy objectives rather than create new
problems, cannot ignore this heavy psychological element, it must
be given sufficient weight in the final analysis regarding drastic
25
U, . ongress. House of Representatives, Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1962, Conference Report, No. 2008, 87th Cong. , 2nd
Sess., July 20, 1962 ( ashington: Government Printing Office, 1962),
pp. 17-18. "The managers on the part of the House concurred in the
position taken . . . that a more vigorous effort should be made to
encourage those foreign governments which have attained a high level
of prosperity to assume larger responsibility for the maintenance and
ipment of their own military forces. They do not consider the
provision to be inconsistent with the statement of policy . . . which
urges the expansion oi multilateral programs . . . particularly to
further the defense of the North ,'tlantic area. ", p. 17.

31
policy changes, since failure to do so would result in ar greater
degree of international instability. Confident that such a factor has
been fully considered in the past, this writer has referred to it in
order to further substantiate his assumption that military assistance
programs, while shifting in emphasis, have not been singled out
for any drastic curtailment of such a nature that would invalidate the
thesis.
"The problem here is not whether the development of demo-
c icy in other countries is desirable when the necessary preconditions
exist, > : said Dr. Arnold V olfers, ". . . but whether in the face of
the Sino-Soviet threat the U. 8* can afford to combat •non-communist'
[_ italics mineJ autocratic governments in situations where the
short-run results would be to weaken the military defenses against
26
the Sino- Soviet thr Dr. ifers has stated that the name
given to aid is not so important, but the use that it is put to that
should govern United States actions.
In all the volumes of debate on the matter of foreign aid, two
sets of relationships have led to all sorts of conclusions. The first
is the economic /military aid factor, which has resulted in a com-
petition between the two. The other is short-term/long-term objec-
tives. From these, and the competitive approach which has developed
26
Iter F. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds. ), loc. cit.

when considering them, Dr. olfers has raised two different
questions:
1. Has the present struggle between the Hast and \ est
changed in such a way that the short- run task of defense of
the V est has come to require more emphasis on economic
and less, therefore, on military aii
2. Has the present danger of the Iiast-V est struggle
receded to a point where short-run defense efforts, whether
military or economic, should give way to long-run efforts
of economic development ?*'
This writer has answered bot!" ies in the negative. rom
an elaboration on the reasons for the negative reply has evolved the
the foreign aid policy upon which the subsequent Civic Action concept
has been built.
The nature of the struggle between the East and V est has changed,
due primarily to the onset of the nuclear stalemate. The nature of the
change, however, has not been such that it could have permitted the
United States, in its own national interest, to lessen its emphasis on
28
defense assistance, military or stability. The expansionist ten-
dency of the Soviet Union must be considered to be the determining




. Jordan, Jr. , I oreign id and the Defense of South-
east /*sia (New York: F. . Praeger, 1962), pp. 7 ff. The author
has presented a comprehensive examination of the aspect of stability
assistance, its various names and categories, and more specifically,
its relationship to military assistance in the restricted sense.
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been the basis for a major portion of the aid program from the be-
ginning of th '.shall Plan to the present. The extension of Soviet
control into the vulnerable southern portion of the Vestern hemis-
phere, and the increased intensity of disruptive activities in South-
east Asia (with indications that communist China, and not Soviet
Russia, has gained the upper hand in guiding the direction of these
movements ) have added to the realization that economic development
assistance alone could not stem the tide of internal revolution and
chaos in these areas.
United States foreign aid has served politically useful purposes
in the past, and there has been no reason to suspect that it could not
be put to similar use in the future. Even the foreign aid antagonists,
and the economic determinists have acknowledged the fact that there
are political "facts of life" to be considered in the administration of
such a program.
By resorting to the practice of cross-purposing aid, especially
in the area of economic development assistance, there has developed
the tendency on the part of the United States to "overshoot" or get
ahead of the actual potential available in many of the underdeveloped
countries. The absorptive capacity of some countries has been below
29
the supply of capital available for long-term development projects.
29
Barbara Yard Jackson, rategy or Stop-
gap?" 3ign Affairs, XU, No. i (October, 1962), p. 94.
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There has been a general neglect of other factors in the social and
cultural spheres which has proved to be contributing causes to
development disappointments, and have had the effect of adding to
30
the degree of instability within a developing country. in aiming
toward objectives which have been too advanced, or perhaps grandiose,
the United States economic aid effort may have been impacting above
31
the level of the sources of the problem.
rfessor Lucian X-^ye has stated that:
nerican tl g seems e a very op
outlo lange
in the new countries. . . . At the deeper is nerican
doctrine on I rests on an extremely sophisticated
and complex image of the nature of human society. I
sense we are inclined to think society as being a
is to a complex machi h interconnecting parts so
U. 5. Congress, Senati . anittec a ..it as,
>pilat Studies on United States Foreign Policy, 86th Cong.
,
ss., :tudy No. 12, by Cer International s, MIT,
iomic, Social, and Political Change in the Underdeveloped
intries and its Implications for United Statss Foreign Policy, M
II, pp. 1165*1268. This study emphasized the importance of balanc
movement within a country, and the dan ent in drawing
generalizations about the levels of advancement fferent aree
These generalisations have undoubtedly contribu the pr
>t, " as this writer has dubbed
im K. Galbraith, M> Positive Approach reign id, M
ffaire p. 444-57. Amfestaa
Galbraith, In a pier ding article, expressed the view that it a
change in the United states concept of assisting in the progress of the
•-•rdevelopec
,
the nation's aid programs would continue
be die amplee, he argue
sideratioa in aid piaro se factors which make capital
assistanc vere (1) 1 ;.-, (2) social justi
ible apparat -nment and public administration, and (4)
a clear sense of purpose of what de 3.

that any movement or development in one part will
be readily transmitted into the movements of the other
parts. 32
In comparing the conflicting moods in the merican approach
to foreign aid, he stated that:
nericans have been the ones who talk the most
about the revolution of rising expectations and the need
to accomplish in one generation what the v est took
centuries to do. W* are the ones who will not admit
. . . that the great problem has been appalling apathy
which often takes the form of undisciplined and blindly
5 1
aggressive emotionalism. JJ
it would not appear presumptuous to assert that such moods
found in the public mind in the United States will have undergone
appreciable revision within the next decac .
American foreign aid policy has been set within a politic
framework, and there has been little indication that political consider-
ations have lost their primacy when making judgments involving
foreign aid. Increased opposition has placed -Lotions on the cut-
lay of military assistance funds. This condition can be expected
prevail until such time that there appears to be a I is threat to
the physical integrity of the underdeveloped nations now t ing
United States assistance. Outright grants of military assistance
hardware to these countries will meet with progressively stiffer
32
Lucier. . Pye, "The Political Impulses and Fantasies Be-
hind Foreign Aid, " The Proceedings ( I the Acac of Political
Science
, XXVII, No. ?. (January, 1962), pp. 20-21.
33
Ibid.
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resistance, given the present nature of the power alinement in the
- est settle .
Economic development assistance, while gaining in promi-
nence as the preferred method of rendering aid to the underdeveloped
nations, will be subjected to more severe restrictions in terms of
34
"hard" and "soft" loans, and loans in general as opposed to grants. "
The conditions of eligibility, while not meeting the strict standards
of the i\;illikan-Rostow approach, have become increasingly con-
•' 35
servative.
Prestige aid will continue to be relied upon, and will un-
doubtedly continue to serve a politically useful role. This factor,
coupled with the elaborate and accelerated aims of the economic
development programs will result in continued overshooting of the
optimum impact area of aid in many of the least developed nations
34
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affair ,
Background \Material on I/jAitual Defense and Assistance Programs
,
88th Cong. , 12th Sess. , April 26, 1963 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1963), pp. 12, 19. This booklet contains a com-
pilation of tables, graphs, and charts, prepared by the Agency for
International Development, with exceptions, for use by the Committee
and The House during the FY 1964 aid deliberations. Appropriation
trends are vividly apparent from the graphic presentations.
35
George Champion, "Foreign Aid: A New Approach, " Vital
Speeches of the lay , XXIX, No. 6 (January 1, 1963), pp. 177-180.
. Champion, an influential banker, has exemplified the kind of
pressure that has been brought to bear on the foreign aid program,
and its association with political considerations to the point where,


















has left a political gap in the development process and has too lightly
dismissed the short-run needs of peace and internal stability. The
real dilemma has arisen in these areas from the fact that indigenous
governments, while they have provided stability (maintained usually
through physical force), have usually been the ones showing the
greatest resistance to social and political change which would enhance
36
economic development. Mr. Henry Kissinger has expressed the
opinion that
. . . there is no country in which democratic institutions
developed 'after' industrialization and 'as a result of economic
development. here the rudiments of democratic institutions
did not exist at the beginning of the industrial revolution, they
did not receive impetus from industrial growth. ... In all
traditional societies, the essentials of the governmental system
antedated the industrial revolution. 37
The question has not been answered in this writing, but it has
illustrated the complexity of the problem, especially when choices
have had to be made regarding assistance and the type political
system receiving it. In short, can the United States survive and
3t
angniew Brzezinski, "The jrolitics of Underdevelopment,
V orld Politics, IK, (October, 1956), pp. 55-75. r. Br?.ezinski
has taken the position that economic development now requires total-
itarian control.
37
Henry /. Kissinger, Die Necessity for Choice: . - . -:...










prosper in a world where democratic systems , of whatever variety
or coloring, would be in a definite minority ? Or, put differently,
is there any avenue of approach which has not been exploited which
would increase the possibility of influencing the underdeveloped
nations, with all their social, economic, political, and cultural
problems in such a way that stable, peaceful, democratic societies
might evolve from the present confusion ?
tie the polemics continue, and the various proponents in
their respective fields crusade for a specific approach to the
problem, it has been assumed by this writer that the basic policy
will not have changed to any significant degree, ft will continue to
be influenced by those factors described above, and the Civic Action
concept has been developed within that framework.
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The U Ate*, in an effort to ach /erall -n
policy objectives, has turn>\
reign aid ssible. This "ne > ch was not usher
in in a fit ox ad its y has ,iven
lence in the tates military
i the 19th and early 20th centuries. Its success in tha ry,
however, has not j d the universal applicat vie ct
each and every case Lxi underdeveloped c 1,
and most imp•TtanLly political and culture ices c
many of the underdeveloped state; rated the nt
extreme caution against the us* Led support :>f thi.\
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an idea once it has appraised as an e leans er
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Civic - : interpreted by this r, must be viewed in
the proper perspec That is, 4e,




might usefully serve as the necessary cohesive, unifying (a
means of bridging the gap) in many of the underdeveloped countries
where its applicability has been and is being put to the test. To use
programs of Civic /ction for justifying larger indigenous military
forces than would otherwise be considered necessary would be an in-
2
stance where the purpose of this approach would be ill-served.
vially damaging would be the use of the concept to meet the pressures
which have been mounting within this country against further allo-
cations of military assistance in areas where a "competitive " relation-
ship has been developed, ideally or realistically, between the different
kinds of foreign assistance. For purposes of clarity in the United
States and for the edification of Congress, separate programs maybe
desirous. However, in an underdeveloped country there must be a
consolidated approach to the problems of development and defense if
optimum security and substantial progress is to be the rule, rather
than the except!
It has been in the atmosphere of the developing nation and its
problems, within the overall fr mework of this writer's concept of
prevailing United States foreign aid policy, that the concept-- Civic
/ction- -has been considered.
2
Kenneth . tamed) Hon as a Cold eapon, "
(Unpublished student Thesis, U. S. Army War College, Carlie




Section 501 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 declared that
".
. . this part _Part II_ may be called the Bate rnational Peace and
Security Act of 1961. United States policy was promulgated, based
on a recognition of the threat of comrauai: world peace, and on
the belief that U. S, security is strengthened by the security .er
free and independent countries. ilitary assistance was '*. . . to
furnish such countries co-operative assistance of a kind and in an
amount reasonably designed to help them provide for their own secur-
ity. . . . *'
4
Further provisions for military assistance were outlined in
various other parts of the Act, one of which svas Section 505. It stipu-
lated that military assistance under the provisions of the Foreign
Assistance Act should be used to M. . . encourage the participation
by the military forces of the less developed countries in programs
5designed to foster economic development. " It was through these
3
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Report of Committee on S. 1983, 87th




It should be noted that this statement of policy guidance was
not an innovation peculiar to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The
Mutual Security ^ct of 1954 contained essentially the same statement
in Section 10D {b), (5), which read f? . . . administrators of military
assistance programs shall encourage the use of foreign military forces
in underdeveloped countries in the construction of public works and
other activities helpful to economic development. M
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provisions of the various foreign aid bills enacted into law that pr
vidcd a legal basis upon which the administrators of foreign aid have
further expanded the concept currently referred to as Civic ction.
Civic Action has been officially defined as
... an aspect of civil affairs . . . any function per-
formed by military forces in co-operation with civil
authorities, agencies, or groups, through the use of mili-
tary manpower and material resources for the socio-
economic well-being and improvement of the civil community
with a goal of building or reinforcing mutual respect and
fellowship between the civil and military communities. 6
Civil .Affairs, referred to in the above definition, has been used
to define the relat: dp between the military commander and civil
?
authorities of a specific area where military forces are present.
The latter may be considered to be broader in scope, and Civic Action
as but one segment of that broad relationship.
The Civic Action concept has been defined and redefined, and
has been burdened more recently with the additional descriptive
adjective--"miiitary"--in an effort to better clarify that particular
3
aspect of United States foreign aid policy.
6
Department of the /rmy, Field Manual (FM41-10), Civil















jor General ' illiam B. Rosson, USA, author of several
articles dealing with the subject of Civic Action, has expressed dis-
may at the apparent general misunderstanding of this important
aspect of foreign aid. His feelings have not been ill-founded, as was
evidenced in his statement that ". . . such questions kept popping up
as to whose military was involved, what does the military actually
do in the Civic Action function ? Or, doesn't AID handle economic
9development assistance t"
The General provided a working definition of Civic Action for
further clarification, which stated that it
. . . involves the use of preponderantly 'indigenous' military
forces on projects useful to the 'local' population at all levels
in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture,
transportation, communications, public health, sanitation, and
others 'contributing' to economic and social development, which
would also serve to 'improve' the standing of the military fore
with the population. (U. S. forces may at times advise or actually
engage in Civic Action activities in overseas areas. )i®
Part of the confusion has also been attributed to the fact that ".
while the activity 'per se' is as old as warfare, the specific designa-
tion, 'Civic a, ' is of relatively recent vintage and is
term. "
; os s on, 'Understanding Civic ction, " Army .ill.





illiam R. Swarm. Col.. US,, -Civic Action, a .peech de-
live red before the annual conference of the Military Government
Association, Hartford, Connecticut, June 15, 1962. Reprinted in The
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The general tendency in the United States has been to perceive
of Civic ction as a much larger program than Btrictly military
Civic .'ction. fuch interpretations have resulted in the acceptance
of the notion that military Civic /ction has been established merely
as a segment of the overall development approach to a recipient
country, which has been referred to simply as Civic Action. As the
concept has been defined, this could not be the case. Civic ction
and military Civic ction could be used as interchangable terms when
the reference has been correctly adduced.
In responding to a request for assistance . . . The I;.
offers the country concerned a variety of plans designee:
promote its national integrity. ... > feature of this c
ordinated planning is the rendering of assistance designed to
enable certain native military forces to contribute to social
and economic advancement, particularly in the remote or in-
surgency-ridden regions where there may be no civil agencies.
. hether we call this activity 'Civic ction* or "Military Civic
ction* is unimportant. . . . The important thing to realize is
that military skills offer an additional means by which local
governments can win the hearts and minds of its people by
demonstrating a concern for their welfare and an ability
improve it.
The activities of other groups --the United Nations, the Agency
for International Development, and various private orga- ns--
have included similar operations, and all have been aimed at the long-
run objective of economic development and modernization. The pro-
grams of these latter organizations could not be considered as falling




within the concept of Civic Action, and if euch classification were
insinuated, it would surely meet with strenuous opposition and resist-
ance. The association of the prime factor of Civic Action- -the
military- -with these other endeavors would have the effect of detract-
ing from what could be considered to be the prime salutary feature
these types of assistance--the fact that they are divorced from
military connotations.
The concept hric Action has been mis-construed for many
reasons, not the least of which has been the recent adoption of the
term. Community development, a term used to describe a specific
approach in the assistance of a nation, and one which has gained con-
siderable recognition recently, has been the process with which Civic
Action has become most commonly confused, litis method of assist-
ance has not been specifically concerned with military forces. It has
been defined by the United Nations
... as the process by which the efforts of the people them-
selves are united with the governmental authorities to improve
economic, social, and cultural conditions of communities, to
integrate these communities into the life of the nation, and to
enable them to contribute fully to national progress. * 3
There has been no specific mention of the military forces in the
above definition of community development. The reason for the con-
fusion between the two has arisen from the otherwise similar nature
13
Unite :ns , Community Development and Economic
Development (New Y rk: United Nations Publications, I960), p. i.

4*
of the approaches to development. The two definitions, as stated,
have revealed similarities, but Civi on has been identifiable by
such characteristics as:
|« Civic Action projects are performed by military s,
whereas community development is carried out principally by ~ther
government agencies.
2. There has been a distinct rapport sought through joint civil-
military co-operation characteristic of the Civic Action approach
which is not peculiar to the community development idea.
3. Civic Action was initiated to gain utilization of military man-
power, equipment, facilities, organization, and resources where other
agencies (the United Nations, private organisations) would not command
14
the use of these services.
The central facet of Civic Action and its application in the field
of foreign aid has been the military establishment of the underdeveloped
nation. The adoption of the concept has not been one of entirely positive
action, and the ability of these programs to meet the changing nature of
the threat to the independence and internal security of the underdeveloped
world has revealed a reactionary characteristic of the approach. The
new twist of Civic .Action in United States foreign aid policy has taken
hold, however, and these activities have been extended to twenty-five
14
llliar warm, op. cit




countries in the Far Fast, ...iddle East, and Latin America.
'.hough Civic Action has been the proud heritage of many
armies throughout the world, and most appropriately the United States
•my, its inherent potential has only recently been fully r i.
The popularity and applicability of this concept have increased signi-
ficantly since the commencement of the so-called Decade of Develop-
ment and establishing of objectives it contains. Part of the newly-
found importance of Civic Action could be attributed to the changing
military strategy of the present Administration from one of massive
retaliation and containment through alliances to what has been referred
16
to as the strategy of 'flexible response. " This shifting strategy has
been adopted for the purpose of meeting and countering more effect-
ively the communist practice of lending maximum support to "wars of
17
national liberation. " This shift still reflects a policy reactive in
nature since the programs have not changed drastically, but have
merely undergone a change in emphasis in this writer's opinion. The
United States has become aware of its role in the underdeveloped
15
Robert E. Slover, Col., USA, "This is uiilitary Civic Action,"
Army, OH, No. 12, July 1963, p. 48.
1
1
U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, op .
cit.
, p. 288.
*" Roger Hiisman, "Internal ar: The New Communist Tactic,"
in T. N. Greene, The Guerrilla- -and How to Fight Him (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 22-36.
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countries, and has acknowledged the fact that these areas have become
exposed to political, socio-economic, and psychological pressures
which in many instances have exceeded the actual threat of military
18
aggression. It has also bee apparent that internal security and
political stability within these countries have become more dependent
upon efforts toward easing the principal sources of pressure, and less
upon a guarantee of protection from the possibility of external
aggression.
There have been several factors in United States relations with
other states which have gained a new significance since the inception
of the concept of Civic ' ction iu American foreign aid policy. .Such
things as the lack of political democracy in the recipient countries,
supporting dictatorships with military assistance, and the resistance
of f ipient governments to agree to needed reform have proved
to be most perplexing. Civic Action, by virtue of the fact that it has
be designed to strengthen the position of the indigenous military forces,
increase the social awareness of the masses, enhance the development
of local government, and add to the general effectiveness of the
pressure which might be applied at the national level, has only added
to the pitfalls of this approach. The risk involved, however, could
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The
Foreign Assistance /ct of 1963, Hearings before the Committee, 88th
Cong. , 1st Session, on S. 1276, June 13 ( Washington: Governm:
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grams, and those of an industrial, or urbanized nature. This disparity
has led to conditions of unrest, especially where the rural populations
have immigrated to the urban areas, only to find that the cities have been
unable to absorb them and completely satisfy their aspirations. The
Civic Action programs have been specifically aimed at those rural
communities for the purpose of creating more stable conditions, and
minimally satisfying the needs of the inhabitants of that level of the
society. This has not been the sole appeal of the Civic Action concept,
but the adaptability of this approach to that type problem has contributed
to its growing acceptance, especially in the recent past when rural tran-
quility has not been a characteristic of nations suffering from internal
instability. 23
Secondly, there has always been the effort in foreign aid programs
of a development assistance nature to create or further develop those
basic prerequisites needed for sustained advancement and growth with-
in the recipient countries. That is, the basic requirements of power,
transportation, communications, and education have been stressed so
as to provide a base for further, and more rapid progress in the drive
toward modernisation. By attacking the problem in the underdeveloped
nations in a way which would provide for stability and a base for
22
" United Nations, Aspects of Kconomic Development (New York:
U. N. r ifice of Public Information, ctudy No. 8, no date), p. 30.
^Special operations Research ffice, aierican University,
Special ' arfare "rea Handbook for Colombia (• ashington: Department















further progress, the United States has put to use a vehicle which
24
holds considerable potential in the field of foreign aid.
The use of a national institution- -the military- -to effect these
basic changes has added to the attractiveness of Civic Action in the
respect that it has represented, In many instances, the only stable
symbol of nationhood which has proved effective in transcending the
25
obstacles of sectional and regional allegianc
Further impetus was provided for the concept of Civic -ction by
the late President Kennedy in December, 196 i, when he expressed the
feeling before the National Security Council which indicated that the
United States might not be doing enough in this field. ^6 A National
Security Council Action Memorandum originating from that meeting
defined three specific situations in which Civic Action would be
particularly useful in achieving overall foreign policy objectives.
1. In countries fighting active campaigns against internal sub-
version, civic action is an indispensable means of strengthening
the economic base and establishing a link between the armed
forces and the populace.
2. In countries threatened by external aggression, forces
should participate in military civic action projects which do not
materially impair performance of the primary military mission.
24 Jay H. Cerf and alter Poaen, op . cit.
, pp. 145-48.
25
ichaei Fdwardes, Asia in the Balance (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, Inc.. 1962), pp. 169-75.
26Statement b} r- General illiam B. Ross on, n a
speech delivered to The Interdepartmental Committee, ashington,









3. la countries where subversion or external attack is less
imminent, selected indigenous military forces can contribute
substantively to economic and social development, and such
a contribution can be a major function of these forces. **
The recent emphasis on self-help in development projects has
also added to the intrinsic worth of the concept. The 1961 address
of President Kennedy to the Congress on foreign aid specifically men-
tioned the fact that special attention would have to be directed to fcl
28
self-help aspects of any aid given by the United States. ithin the
United States Army measures have been taken which accentuate this
principle. >blls ction teams have been formed for the pur-
pose of rendering assistance to projects of a self-help nature,
primarily, in that these teams have not been permanently assigned to
any one particular country. The technical qualifications of the various
teams differs markedly also, which has further added to their
29
flexibility and mobility. The mobile team approach was designed
to provide "trouble-shooting" services to the various military missions
within the recipient countries, and they have not been dispatched except
when specifically requested by the Ambassador concerned. Even then,
27
Ibid . The Kiemorandum referred to was National Security
'ction .emorandum No. 119» December, 1961, which was specifically
mentioned in the speech, but was unavailable to the writer supposedly
for security reasons.
28 u. S. Government, Department of State Bulletin , LVT, No.
1137 (April 10, 1961), p. 507.
29
United States Army, Civil Affairs School, Stan
Procedures for Civic ction Teams, n. d.
, pp. 5-12.

the teams remain in an area only for that period of time required to
meet the needs of the country and th confronted with problems
30
of a Civic Action nature.
Civic Action operations have been generally classified either by
the level of direction and /or the security situation of the area under
sideration. The level of direction classification has had to do
primarily with the source of initiative resulting in the Civic Action
project, whether it was generated from a national plane or resulted
from a voluntary scheme on the local level aimed at community
improvement. The importance of this classification can be appreciated
when consideration for overall country development has been established
as the long-run objective. Consistent with that objective, there has
often arisen a need for a determination as to whether local projects
should be undertaken which, upon th npletion, have added little
or nothing to overall national development.
Projects which have been considered at the local level, and have
been found to be of negative value as far as national development is
concerned, have presented a dilemma. The question which then must
be resolved is whether or not such a project, and the associated costs,
justified politically. Many local projects have resulted in
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•iteration, .'bviously, the Ion objective of national development
must necessarily be relr i secondary importance.
The advantages of local relative cc
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association cal popul military forces would far
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in thee >.s that anything other than local Civic operations
would have resulted in complete failure economically, socially, and
political! .
The close ass. a of Civic >n and counter-insurgency
has c ',ht through a consideration of this latter classification.
As has be arlier, the nature of the threat facing the
^1
rmy, Civil (fairs School, Civic A ction and
Community Programming, No. 4413/1, (September, 1962), pp. J









United State* on the international scene has taken shape in the form of
guerrilla warfare, and the task confronting this nation has been to attempt
where practicablo, f ove the source of unrest. To expect that Civic
/ction operations alone could accomplish such a task would be totally un-
realistic, but to assert that they have no utility would be equally foolish.
The internal situation in any recepient country must be con-
sidered when determining the applicability of any Civic ction operation.
' ituations which have degenerated to such a degree that active military
operations have been undertaken to counter guerrilla activity have been
designated active areas. .rations presently in progress in Vietn-'
have exemplified this condition. Passive areas might be considered to
be in existence in several regions throughout the world, especially in
Latin merica. That is, periodic or consistent breakdowns in inter-
nal security have not been considered commonplace, but pressures have
been such that corrective action could not long be delayed without
serious consequences.
The essential difference between these areas, and the applica-
tion of Civic a to them, has been further clarified by the use of
the terms "curative" and "preventive. " In the former, conditions have
usually deteriorated to such a state that local civilians in the infested
areas of a nation have been almost totally concerned with survival,
rather than loyalty and support for the national government. In these




operations and protection of the people, and not so much assistance
in local development. In short, Civic Action has been supplanted by
a more critical requirement. Such situations have revealed what
might be considered to be an inherent weakness in the applicability
of Civic ction. But when one has viewed internal situations in a
different light, a new urgency has been given to the need for further-
ing such programs in the many areas of the world where the situation
has not as yet progressed to the active stage, and preventive measures
could still prove effective. . . Rostow, in an address to the
graduating class at the U. ny Special V arfare School at Fort
Bragg, stated that:
can learn to prevent the emergence of the famous
sea in which Mao Tse-tung taught his men to swim. This
requires, of course, not merely a proper military program
of deterrence but programs of village development, communi-
cations, and indoctrination. The best way to fight a guerrilla
war is to prevent it from happening. And this can be done. 33
I the time of the above statement, Mr. Sostow was serving as
Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
,
cuch a statement, from a person in that position, might bw interpreted
readily as a substantial endorsement of the com f Civic /ction
it applies to United States military strategy today.
Civic /ction has not been envisioned as a substitute for military
33
. Rostow, "Guerrilla arfar in Underdeveloped Areas, M
inc Corps Gazette , Vol. 4: (J unary, 1962), p. 49.
I
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power, but an integral part of it. This relationship has been most
readily exemplified in those areas of active counterinsurgency. As
stated in a recent article published by the Department of Defense, "
. . . As the interdependence of civil and military matters is increasingly
recognized, the social and lie welfare of the people can no longer
34
be considered a non-military concern. " in those areas which could
be classified as passive, this has been the principal task d the
military. Their efforts have been directed toward the economic and
social betterment of the communities concerned.
The realization of the objectives of Civic Action has been depen-
dent upon the impact it has had on the people concerned, and the degree
of association and allegiance to the national government extracted from
them. The support, loyalty, and identification of the people with the
military has been the measuring device in this determination, since
the military in these regions has been the representative of the national
government.
hat state, who would beget the "status" of a state, would be
without a military establishment V The essence of that question could
not be meaningful except in terms of the present day feelings of the
various leaders of the states constituting the international community.
Applied to the concept of Civic Action, it means that the vehicle chosen
34
U. S. Government, Department of Defense, "Civic Action: The
Itary Role in Nation Building, " This Changing orld, III, . 14
(January 15, 1964), p. 1.
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for the implementation of the concept would be practically universally
available. The military establishments of many of the underdeveloped
nations have provided an element of the society which has contained the
most effective lea Lp, the most highly trained labor force, and the
best organization to be found in those areas. ich has not been tl
entire story concerning the role the military could play in the under-
developed areas, however, and there have been problems of a larger and
more politically significant nature which have merited consideration.
Has there been any relationship between the growing use of mili-
tary Civic Action and the increasing tendency toward military 'coups"
in the underdeveloped countries ? U so, how has this affected United
States foreign policy, and how would an affirmative relationship be
accepted by the American people, in view of the fact that military govern*
ments have not met with resounding accolades in this country, ^iso,
has not the assistance rendered to the local communities in the under-
developed areas through voluntary programs not sponsored by the
national government concerned led to great factionalism •, have
Civic Action undertakings, while bringing about conditions of s el -
economic betterment, only caused the internal political situation to
become more confused and unstable
35 dward ^ils, "The Military in the Political Development of
New States, " in John J. Johnson (ed. ), The i ilitary in










th these questions in mind, the writer has turned his attention
to the problem areas involved in the Civic ction approach to foreign




The Civic ction concept, ^Uned previously, has no newly-
found formula for insuring success. It is not the long sought aft
panacea. Neither will my and all c-
id be encou by the United vernment in implementing
a vast foreign assistance program. acept does, nevertheless,
provide soxv .hod of approaching a great international
situations in fc. wher r types of p I man ng
have failed to yield successful results. In fact, the civic action concept
may yet p* rkabl of «tch suits where
others have not only not been successful, but have been marked as
dismal failures as far as the I I interest has been
concerned.
In Lattvely limited, yet comprehensive study
of what has constit le gre l a sources in civic action,
and also as close to the heart j>f the subject as possible, the
writer has c< -150X185 these p is within th (i)
the re lit, (2) the masses of the reci : , and
(3)th« snous military farces. Necessarily, the relationships b -
tween these n the Unix ve





By reference to actual experience, there has perhaps arisen
the fallacy of extracting theoretical generalizations fr <latcd
actual cases. The writer has made a conscious effort to avoid such
a pitfall, and has resorted to such generalities only in those areas
where it has become more or less universally accepted. For example,
it has not been considered erroneous to assume that political leaders
of nations have been influenced in their actions by an innate desire or
liking for power and prestige. Similarly, the basis of individual
revolutionary fervor in the underdeveloped world has been found to
be less among those whose stomachs are empty and are living in the
depths of squalor and despair than among those who have seen or
i
tasted a spattering of the better things in life. (It is true, however,
that the majority of the masses of th Id are to be found in the
latter classification. )
The Recipient Government
United States foreign aid, in whatever form, has been extended
to nearly every nation in the world since the end of the Second V orid
2
r. program with practically universal operation has shown
James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Tlaadows (New York:
Doubleday & Co., tie. , 1963), p. 20.
2
The Clay Report , March 20, 1963.
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in past years that universally applicable guidelines, when adopted
for use, have confused issues more oft i they have aided the
implementation of the program.
The fact that no two nations are exactly alike would suffice to
explain the above statement, but similarity in ail other aspects
except the specific government and its method of ruling would be
sufficient reason to dispell any thought of applying go erning
principles of a general nature to foreign assistance.
The government of a recipient nation must, in the first instance,
be in a position to receive assistance in a form which would be
compatible with what wvuld o establish, and successfully
implement, a civic action type progra . basic fact, and one which
has probably been conveniently overlooked by many critics of foreign
aid in general lias been that of the sovereignty of states, and the
political independence of the governments representing those states.
Irregardless of the credence anyone would place in the validity
this aspect of sovereignty, and the political freedom resulting there-
from, a perplexing problem has resulted when programs of Civic
"ction have been encouraged by the United States but not desired by
the recipient government. The power of suggestion has proved
useful, but has never been considered decisive. The alternatives to
a stro; - ided recipient government are f^w. Assistance may be
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In most instances, since the recipient governments have been afforded
bargaining alternatives by other aid-producing groups , the choice
3
compromise has been the most appropriate, generally.
The government of an underdeveloped recipient nation must be
intimately understood with respect to its aims, where it gets its
majority support, and what kind and how much control it has been
given, or has been able to gain, over the country. ctatorahip,
with absolute control, poses minimal problems in so far as under*
standing where the crux of national power has been vested. In an under-
developed state with a dictatorial regime, however, the benefits of a
Civic Action program have not been considered very attractive. There
would be no great benefit derived from a strengthening of the local
elements of the government, nor would a closer 'rapport' 1 between
the military forces and the masses be considered beneficial where a
coalition of the two would present control problems for the dictator.
States controlled in the above manner, and also infected with sub-
versive and guerrilla elements, have taken assistance, but have gener-
ally delayed any form of Civic Action operation with a view toward
3
U. S. Congress, Senate, United olicy
,
Compilation of Studies 9-13, Committee of Foreign Relations, 86th
Cong., 2nd Sess. , Vol II, September, i960, Study No. 12 ( Vashing-
ton: Government Printing Office, I960), p. 1173. This study,
entitled "Economic, Social, and Political Change in the Underdeveloped
Countries and its implications for U, >reign Policy, M conducted by
The Center for International Studies, MIT, has referred to this
phenomenon as "the strategy of third choice.
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removing the infection first, and then effecting reforms at some time
yet to come when the situation would be considered less critical. The
usual outcome in such instances has been the collapse ,-erthrow
of that ne before the time for implementing Civic Action has ever
4
been considered appropriate.
Stability in government has been an additional problem with
which the United States has had to contend when dealing in foreign
assistance. It has not been too surprising that many of the newer states
have had some difficulty in maintaining an acceptable degree of stability
in their attempts to make a majority government function.
a a people associate independence with an immediate
improvement of their standard of living, there must be
vigorous economic developments which are bound to affect
the whole structure of life down to the level of the simplest
farmers and pastoraiists.
Small wonder that some of the new untried constitutions
have buckled under the strain of conducting so many oper-
ations at once, at the same time trying to maintain civil
liberties, conduct free elections, and attempt government by
debate. They have had to do this while allowing attacks of
an opposition not yet fully schooled in political mode rat :
and based, perhaps less on party principle than upon regional-
ism or religion, in some countries, faced with the weakness
of new constitutional government, ;he one irresistible
authority—the A rmy--has taken power.
Likewise, in an economic sense, government instability some-
ies has been the result of the leaders attempting to do what they
4
James Eliot Cross, loc. cit.
5
vgery I-erham, "Political and Psychological /spects of
Development, " Restless Nations (New York: Dodd & Mead and Co.
,
Council on World Tensions, 1962), pp. 22-23.
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have considered beat for the country.
In a poor society, both production and consumption are
so low that not only is the gap between the two infinitesimal,
but any increase in rx tends to get absorbed
increased consumption unless corrective measures t
applied to hole n in check. la a free society, in
which the rulers are freely chosen by the masses of the
people, no government has a chance of continuing in office
if it fails to satisfy, in however small measure it je,
the urge for an immediate increase in consumption. ^
In other areas, such as Lati; rica, an oligarchy form of
rule in government has had an adverse effect on the United States
endeavors in most instances. The prime attractiveness of such
governments for the United States has been their violently strong
anti-communist philosophies. Such positions by these groups, how-
ever, have been tt is for problems c ar kind.
ar dilemma in relation to military aid and internal sub-
version ... is the difficulty in distinguishing genuine native
movements from alien communist infiltration. This becomes
more serious since in some cases the communists have prosti-
tuted and taken over worthy causes to serve their own ends. . . .
There is considerable danger that ilitary aid will be used
not only to combat communism, but also to suppress legitime
jgressive movements and/or to maintain one group in power.
. . . Trends indicate that the traditional eli . ire on
their way out as an effective political force. K we allow our
military aid to support this group under the blanket of combat-
communism, we may find ourselves identified with this group,
and consequently by implication the enemies of future success
to political power. *
Thomas (ed. ), The Nc oreign Aid
New York: Columbia U. Press, 1962), pp. 53-54.
7Norman D. Palmer, "The Impac id, " Current
History
, Vol. 33, No. 192, (September, 1957), p. 148.
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society within a country ruled in the above fashion has caused consider-
able concern for thos savoring to institute a civic rogram.
In addition to modern central government organisation,
rapid development in these societies requires eff links
between the political an < rater and the masses of
the people in the villages and on the farms. ting or re-
vitalizing these links is generally recognised to b jf the
essential develop- >£ government. The community
development scheinee . » . re an effort to provide an
institutional framework to permit and encourage the peasant
masses to contribu svelopment. 8
The task has proved to be more than a mere establishment of
institutions. It has been one of convincing ti o have become
the object of this inducement by the government that there are benef
to be had, and that the programs proposed have soniv ree of
9
attainability. The attitudes toward change displayed in the under-
developed lands have favored more of a slow, minor, beneficient tyr
associated with works that have reflected mass betterment. These
have proved to be less prone to create or result in violent rebellion
and gross instability than have those of questionable b«'*v*£it at so:
10
future point m time.
a
. Jordan, Foreign ensc of Southeast
Asia (New York: Frederick T. Praeger, 1962), p. 179.
;ene R. Black, the Diplomacy of Economic Development












The above comparison of project types, and the general tendency
of recipient government* to select the "future benefit" ones (not
necessarily for the benefit to be derived, but perhaps so for the
prestige value connected with them) has given birth to the phrase
"jumping the gap. u The gap, economically, has generally been c
strued to mean that period of de\ aent from a primitive stage to a
point beyond which economic growth, with sufficient outside assistance,
11
could be fostered and maintained. This practice of so-called jump-
ing the gap, which has become commonplace among the underdeveloped
nations, has introduced one of the more • its to the
effective implementation of a civic action program, or any other
12
assistance venture. national airline, with all the latest jet air-
craft and re 1 associated costly paraphernalia, in lieu of a bett
system of internal transportation for the movement of people, goods,
and services has been an example which has brought this problem
vividly to the public mind.
Actions by recipient governments of a political nature in inter-
national organ: ;S have often severely rest the degree
Lucian V . Pye, "The Social and Political Implications of
Community Development, " Community Development Review , Vol. 5,
(December, i960), pp. 11-21. The "gap, " as interpreted by the
author in the political sense, is the void between the national govern-
ment and the rural masses.
12
Dr. Lng and its Limitatio 1-
(June, 1962), p.
;8«A t




Jble to the United States government in rendering any
kind of assistance. The people involved in these operations in gover -
ment have not been able to act with immunity from internal pressures
nating from the actions of a recipient government. Independent,
and often indiscreet actions by governments receiving assistance which
have involved those areas of vital interest to the United States have
severely restricted the latter's ability, and in some instances, its
13
willingness to meet 'bona fide" recipient needs.
The still- simme ring dispute between Panama and the United
States has vivified yet another problem area with recipient govern-
ments. That is, in the internal political machinations of the various
parties or groups, all have found it advantageous to place the United
States involvement or presence in the forefront as a major election
apaign issue. This practice, in itself, has not always had an unde-
sirable effect; but, when the United States itself has become a negative
issue, and it has been subjected to vilification and ridicule irregardless
of its position, right or wrong, strained relations have inevitably en-
sued. In short, the practice of using th?. United States and its policies
as a football in what has been analag^'is to a national political "punting"
contest has not been enjoyed by the government or people of this nation.*^
Hubert H. Humphry* 'I Vote 'Aye* for India, ' Aid Digest
,
(July, 1962), pp. 15-16.
14Time , Vol. 83, No. 6 (February 7, 1964), pp. 38, 41; Vol.
83, No. 9 (February 28. 1964), p. 42.












The Classes of the Recipient Nation
The Civic A ction concept haa been pointedly directed toward the
individual. The principal guideline or parameter for measuring a
successful civic action undertaking has been the degree of association
and allegiance extracted from the individual toward the military, hence
the national government. The importar achieving the maximum
degree of support from the massos for the government can be fully
appreciated only when it has been realized that therein is contained the
essence of the struggle. Theorists on the art of guerrilla warfare,
without exception, have stated categorically that without the co-operation
and support, or at least a passive and/or indifferent attitude of the
15
masses, a guerrilla operation has been foredoomed to failure. The
chief attractiveness of Civil Action has been couched in that very
theorem of guerrilla war. Civic Action, too, has been destined to fail
in terms of positive achievement where its advocates have neglected
to gain the support and assistance of the people it was designed to help.
Since the masses have been the focus of these two diametrically
opposed approaches— Civic Action and Guerrilla V arfare-«a closer
look at this focal point has been taken.
The element of change, and mass reaction to that change, has
made the challenge of gaining the support of the people so essential.
15
. Griffith, Brig. Gen., USJv C (ret. ),
on Guerrilla • arfare (New York: I. . . aeger, 196i), p. 42.
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cial, political, and economic change are taking place
in the underdeveloped countries. hat form these changes
take we cannot be sure, but we can be sure they will affect
the United States greatly. And we can be sure that what we
do or do not do can greatly influence these changes and the
course they take.
The basic fact that change has been occurring, or the fact that
the majority of the peoples in the world have ns aware of possible
changes for the better, has become generally accepted. This phenomenon
has been collared with the phrase "revolution of rising expectations, "
and its use has caused the term to approach becoming another "cliche. M
at has more appropriately described the conditions in many areas
of the world has been the phrase 'frustrations of rising aspirations.
The result of these frustrations has been political unrest in those
areas where economic and social conditions have not been regarded
as favorable among the inhabitants. This unrest has taken the form
of revolts, general upheaval, and, where the proper elements have
been able to infiltrate, guerrilla and subversive activity, its origin
can be traced, in the majority of instances, to mass discontent,
frustration, and disappointment.
Feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with
economic conditions are influenced not only by what one
has and expects to have, but also by what one wants to
have. This fact has largely been ignored by the
3tern world where aspirations are high and tend to
grow with income, so that small increments of income
do not appreciably affect the two. But in countries
p. 1171





where the masses have never experienced high levels
of living, where evidence £ alternatives to present
conditions and the concept of economic progress itself
cannot be taken for granted, the level of living people
want or aspire to cannot justifiably be ignored. Indeed,
in such countries the level of aspirations may be mc
important in explaining unrest than the realized or expected
level oi living. l '
The auth he above statement further developed this
aspiration theory by assuming that a difference between what an indi-
vidual wanted and what he actually expected, based on past realisations,
could provide an indicator for determining the degree nomic
satisfaction or dissatisfaction existent in a given society. This indi-
cator, while it could serve to explain economic discontent, could not
show what form the unrest might take, one of which would be
18
revolution.
In considering the masses, and in an attempt to guide any efforts
in their behalf, including Civic /ction, a clip-shod and pragmatic
approach has not always provided a solution. Balance has been the
principal factor in any successful approach to this problem of the
masses in the underdeveloped areas, and Civic ction programs, with-
out a balanced approach, would not be considered an exception. They
would merely aggravate conditions which the concept was designed to
17 Ronald G. Ridker, "Discontent and Economic Growth, "







avert. An example of how improper balance in any given area znight
reap negative results has been exemplified in the following statement.
The need for the expansion of education is urgent and
obvious. should use caution in that expansion along these
lines adds to an increased effectiveness in mass communica-
tions, thereby resulting in a rise in aspirations. This in
itself, forging ahead of the ability of the national government
to meet the expectation level of the masses, let alone their
aspirations, can give rise to considerable unrest and chaos.
Letting one know what he could aspire to without the capability
to satisfy the aspiration, could be self-defeating. *"
In Civic Action, the emphasis has been on getting things done
of a physical nature which could provide some immediate benefit to
the people involved in the progra. .
The problem of reaching the masses in the remotest areas of a
recipient country has also shed favorable light on the Civic Action
approach as opposed to other "grass roots" programs. The fact that
the indigenous military forces have not only been able to bring worth-
while improvements to these areas, but that they have been able
do so without being intimidated by terrorists and insurgents has further
20
enhanced the credibility of the concept.
The Philippine example of United States participation in a Civic
ction operation has contained valuable lessons concerning the masses
19




David urf . , oreign Aid a in Political
Deveiopmen. hilippine Case Study, " The American Political
Science Review, Vol. LIE, No. 2, (June, 1959), p. 478.
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which should not be overlooked in any such undertaking. In that
endeavor, -ha Civic Action achievement had been subjected to many
imped which hav present in similar instances
recently. The government was relative! the country was under
heavy attack from communist subvers -:ments, known as MHuks, "
and most important, the remote village masses were the central
figures in the insurgent action.
The Huks were recruiting most of their support from
the tenant farmers, who were being exploited by landlords,
and bankers in a near-feudal system of economic peonage.
• • •
Reports emanating from investigation of the Civic Action en-
deavor in the Philippines gave special emphasis to the particular
problem a£ the masses. Other facets of the operation were also
covered, but a story of a particular peasant involved, and what the
action meant to him, has merited repeating in some detail.
e of the strongest elements of the developing
community is found in its economic progress. . . .
asebio ; .ontano, 43 years of age, brought his wife
and eight children to FDCOR 1 ] lie Development
Corps, tt lipjpine Army designation for the Civic
tion operation^ in February 1951. . . . Their total
assets amounted to one ax, th t, the clothing on
their backs plus one change of garments, and several
sleeping mats. . . .
21
The President's Committee to Study the U.S. military ssist-
ance Program, Supplement, Annexes, Vol II (August, 1959), p. 134.
22
U. S. Government, Department of Defense, "Civic Action:
The h ilitary Hole in Nation Building, H This Changing orld, Vol. in,
No. 14, (15 Jemuary, 1964), p. 1.
I .q t (£d9I «Y^ J
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er two years, the ivxontanos were self-supporting,
jebio owes the government 2000 pesos Jlpeso was the
equivalent of one-half dollar, merican currency^ . . . .
He expects to repay this amount without difficulty within a
period of five years. . . .
•lsebio can count on an income of 4, 000 pesos a year
from 2 hectacres of coffee alone; and a yearly income of
10, 000_pcsos becomes a. distinct possibility. > hen asked how
much the farm__ was worth, Fusebio pondered a minute and
replied, 'I wouldn't take 6, 000 pesos for it. * To the ex-
peasant, this amount was the ultimate for comparison.
Could the above be considered representative cf an isolated
success story ? Perhaps so today, since the follow-up of the Civic
Action program has been considered a failure in view of the excellent
24
start it had. It has reflected a case, however, where the possible
realizations of an individual actually exceeded his aspirations -
condition hardly likely to have been susceptible to dissatisfaction
and discord.
The lack of mass initiative has had a negative effect on any
potentially successful Civic Action or other development undertaking.
The prcblem in the past has been to discount this hindrance as a dis-
advantage with which the operators had to contend. "There are two
sources of cultural and personal obstacles to change, " wrote one
23
vin H. Scaff, The r1lilippinee , /nswer to Communism
(Stanford U. Press, 1955), pp. 97-98.
24
The President's Committee, loc. cit.
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author in 1959, M(l) attitudes and values which resulted from a colonial
heritage, and (2) indigenous cultural values . . . such as belief in
25
certain religions. M He surmised that barriers from the first source
resulted in such things as a loss of leadership, overurbanination,
dislike for whites, and mass disillusionment due to a very slow rate
of growth. The second source presented such problems as an over-
emphasis on religious aspects of life as compared to materials, class
stratification and age status, an anti-science mentality, and a lack of
national consciousness.
If any or all of the above observations have been accepted, then
there could have been little amazement caused by the statement that
Civic Action holds no unheralded secret for complete success. How-
ever, where a relationship has been drawn between those barriers,
such as the leadership factor, and the Civic Action concept and what
it was designed to do, considerably more hope for success with Civic
Action can be justified*
The Indigenous Military Force s
The Civic Action concept has been developed around the nucleus
of the indigenous military establishment. Several reasons for the
selection of this element of the societies of the underdeveloped states
25
Pmllip M, Hauser, "Cultural and Personal Obstacles to Econ-
omic Development in the Less Developed Areas, M Human Organisation,





have been alluded to previously. Their utilisation in the areas of
political* social, and economic advancement has been considered
prudent in the following ways
:
1. The military establishment, like the civil service, trans-
cends regional boundaries and loyalties within the nation, and this has
27
been considered a desirable attribute within a developing area.
2. In insurgency ridden areas, where civil protection has not
been considered optimum, the national military forces have been able
to gain access to those regions, and Civil Action has provided the
government with an instrument with which it might enhance national
28
loyalties within the masses.
3. Training, which has always been a basic function of any
sound military establishment, has provided a valuable source of skilled
manpower and organisation which would otherwise be lacking in many
of the underdeveloped nations. In a development context, a nation
which did not fully utilize the military in such activities might be con-
sidered not employing its total resources in that development effort.
4. The military forces of the underdeveloped areas, in a majority
of instances, have not found themselves involved in actual military
operations which have demanded their full employment for the survival
27 Edward -Ixils, "The I/Jilitary in the Political Development of the
New Ftates, M in John J. Johnson (ed. ), The Hole of the military in
Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1962), p. 32,
28
hJ. Gen. m. B. Rosson, USA, "Understanding Civic Action, "
/*rmy, Vol. Ill, No. 12 (July, 1963), p. 51.
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of their nation. The latent potential of these forces has become
apparent, and the fact that such establishments have been universally
existent has further elicited their utility in the area of s ic
development.
5. In a negative sense, the absence of other effective elements
through which development might be pursued and nurtured has furthered
the use of the military in the Civic Act le.
It has become increasingly evident that many problem areas
have been brought to light or have been newly created by the fact that
the indigenous military has been placed in this dubious position of
relative national importance. It has been unfortunate, perhaps, that
many of the distasteful problems in the underdeveloped states involving
the military have been so closely associated with this nation's efforts
in the Civic •' ction field. iany states have been troubled by civil-
military relations historically, and it would be safe to assume that
situations would not change appreciably in this regard with or without
Civic Action programs. Such situations should be considered in any
event, so that the effect of Civic Action on them might be viewed in a
truer perspective, even though a definitive relationship between Civic
tion and the civil-military problem has not been determined in this
writing.
It might also be considered superfluous to assert that the position




ided or persuaded, could be used for 3 purposes. The pt
has been successfully applied in the United States, but equal success,
especially in the critical area of indigenous military employment, in
countries where the foundations of civil-military relations have not been
so firmly inculcated, would be expecting too much of Civic Action. The
direction any one particular nation's military establishment might
follow has depended as much on the establishment itself than on any
other single influencing factor.
The armed forces of the underdeveloped states, and their involve -
men in the political machinations of their governments, have not
29
created a pleasant image in the minds American people. That
this -"ttitude has been fostered, and has continued to flourish, has 8
necessarily been the result of narrow-mindedness, superior thinking,
or civilian prejudice on the part of the United States. There have be
too many instances throughout the history of the Latin American states,
and more recently within the newly independent nations, of military
"coups d'etat" which have resulted in the sudden demise of ostensibly
duly instituted constitutional governments. The American national
29 General Curtis E. Le ^y, U ress to the Central
States Shrine Association, St. Louis, Missouri, October 19» 1963, as
cited in U. . government, Department of Defense, Air Force Informa-
tion Policy Letter, Supplement for Commanders , No. 125 (November,
1963), p. 18. The General stated that: ". . . However, our progress. .
could be jeopardized by the pretation that some people are placing
on military coups in Latin They see the /elopmcots as





tempera* s not been capable of a as by the
..itary . so of ^mate go
has been assumed almost cate that any accession t troi
by the military in any country, by whatever means, could only be
de*. -tal to that country's . It has been comm.
in past years to label any n unconstitutional, i
politically unsound.
in developing a Civic Action concept, the previously mentl
attitude t. and feelings have not or a sufficiently concrete basis
upon which to i been considered necessary t r
the indigenous military estabU&hments of these states within t ntext
of their own society and surroundings, and not on the basis of traditional
United States civil-military reiat . since the latt
considered unique in it<» rarity. iai consc; mrce
officer leadership, and role (realistic or functional} oilitary
establish traditionally, as . the modern ay
within the icauing eiemaat /ranted a reas.-.
traditional American way of thinking in this critical a
succeed, or at least prevent failure in its endeavor
This reassessment has been b~grudgingly forth In
rt, it has been the i authority
64.
taMtfftM ... xsit^Kv MteJi »«»jf| to l*N»rcrf?ilo' i>t*i* \r*iiJj.{hr ,v; i—L^f i»xiJ
-
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within the United States that not all military "coups, " in every instance,
have constituted an irrevocable- catastrophe for the nation concerned,
31
and/or for /merican interests in relation to it.
There can he no question concerning the fact that the local military
establishments in the underdeveloped countries which have embraced
the Civic Action concept have been placed in a delicate position. In
those areas where Civic Action has been undertaken, and the military
forces have not been preoccupied with active counterinsurgency
operations, such as Latin America, the relationship between Civic
/ction and the position of the military as a result of those operations
has been rather nebulous. Such conditions have worked a hardship on
those elements of the military which have not been properly educated
in the proper application of the concept. They have had to combat the
tendency to look upon such functions as having opted the primary mission
of national defense. here such education has been initiated and re-
ceived in the proper perspective, the attitudes of the military forces
3
1
The Denver Post, October 9, 1963. The reason for the
change of heart by some State Department officials, as reported in
the news article, had been the fact that modern military rulers "...
are less dictatorial than their predecessors. . . . n However, the
policy of the United States, as reported in the same article dealing
with a State Department briefing, was ". . . the United States is
opposed to all military coups and believes they should be dealt with
vigorously. hile the military are in office, the United States expects
them to move toward a return to civil government, keep civil liberties,




toward Civic /ction have been noticeably favorable.
There have been instances where the military has not hesitated
to take control of the government when they felt the national objectives
were being stymied by those in power. Such excuses as the inability
of the government to discern and control developments which would
have ostensibly led to a communist take-over have been used as just
33
fication for their action. Another common explanation for such action
by the military forces has been the absence of, or the slowness of
action by the government designed to bring about the desired or promised
reforms. Evidence regarding the effect Civic /ction has had in those
areas experiencing a growing number of "coups" has been insufficient
to provide any conclusive relationships. V hile it might be possible to
draw some correlation in an adverse sense, it could also be perhaps as
effectively proved that the association of these forces with Civic Action
operations has contributed to the more recent tendency of "juntas" to
reflect progressive, rather than traditionally conservative philosophies
when they do accede to control.
32
Time, Vol. 83, No. 8 (February 21, 1964), p. 43. / convincing
article on Civic /ction in operation in Columbia, where the application
of the concept has appeared to be taking effect, and the military forces




, p. 49. The article carried a statement by
former president Ydigoras of Guatemala which heaped praise upon the
military for their efforts in Civic /ction. It was ironic that he was
subsequently deposed by those people for his inability" to control
communism within the country.
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iiitary leadership in the tinderdeveloped countries has been
divided into two segments --older, orld War II and prior, and the
present generat 'icers--in an effort to show that the above state-
ment of progressive "juntas" may hold a degree of credibility. The
point of concern has been whether or not Civic Action has led to in-
creased militarism, or has provided the military forces in the under-
developed areas with a new sense of purpose, leading to greater civil-
military co-operation, and a lesser readiness to assume control of
governments as a result of continued frustrations.
Some characteristics of the older groups of military leaders of
the less developed states, where the initiative for decisive action
against the government in power was comparatively less (from the
standpoint of instituting social reform, and such), have been;
1. / small, well-educated, elite, conservative group.
2. / socially highly stratified, non-communicable group with
relation to the aspir tions of the masses. They fostered the concept
of a high class /low class, intelligensia /illiterate division within the
country.
3. The positions of command occupied by the senior officers in
those times prior to Civic Action type programs gave them no oppor-
tunity to gain an association with the people, something Civic Action
was designed to sponsor.




them to strive for and cling to positions of security, and they also
showed an affinity for adapting politically to positions of prestige.
5. If and when this group had been driven to resist the happen-
ings in government, the moving force more often than not was the
drive for personal power, or the enhancement of the position of the
military in general, but generally not in behalf of the great majority
34
of the masses, whose lot usually remained the same in any
The present generation of officers who have been directly in-
volved in the operational implementation of programs oi ic
'ction nature have undoubtedly been influenced in some manner.
1. . large number of these leaders have been the object
much of the U. 5. training programs associated with Military assist-




Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and x-olitics in Latin America (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations, F. Praeger, I960), pp. 125-
132. The compilation of characteristics of this group, as well as
those of the younger generation of officers, has been the writer's
summation based on factors mentioned in various other writings in
this general area.
35 Robert J. .od, General, U. an address before The
Conference on New Nations and Their Internal Defense, U. S. M. / .
,
st Point, New York, April 19, 1963. General Wood, then Director
of Military Assistance, gave the number of foreign military personnel
trained by the United States in 1962 alone as 27, 330. He also stated
that '. . . they are the coming leaders of their nations. M
; .1
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2. In Civic Action and/or counterinsurgency operations, the
officer corps of the indigenous military farces have been closely
associated with the masses, their problems, and their aspirations
and needs. None has been considered immune to at least a minimal
influence as a result of that association. Having been closely allied
with the sources of much of the discontent within their countries,
coupled with the added frustration of not witnessing proper reform
action by the government, could possibly explain the added tendency
of these groups to become inv Ived in "coups?. "
3. The younger elements of the officer corps in these states
have usually had no position too dear to change, and more often than
not, have stood a chance of gaining considerably through drastic action.
4. A greater proportion of the officers of this group have not
descended from the aristocracy. Even those who have had such
lineage, not all have been without revolutionary fervor (resulting per-
haps from their exposure to philosophies other than traditional ones,
but not necessarily altruistic ones).
5. This group has also developed aspirations of their own, and
36
they have often been tied to the destiny of the country they serve.
The assumption of power by the military, and subsequent con-
trol by "junta" has not been considered an acceptable solution to the
36 Edwin Lieuwen, loc. cit. Also, The VWashington Post, July




problems of government in the less developed states. It has not been
condoned by the United States in its relations with these nations in the
past. The United States, as a result, has frequently found itself
powerless to act in the face of an accomplished fact, and has eventually
recognized such take-overs out of necessity, and in an effort to pro-
tect its interests or exert a favorable influence in these areas, /side
from the anti-democratic taint of a military government, the principal
danger inherent in this type control has been the deleterious t it
has had on any hoped-for eventual development »n the direction of
government by democracy. "Junta" control has usually been accompanied
by suppression of any opposition, and a generally tighter political con-
trol than had previously existed. The highly concentrated political
control found in a military government has also revealed an added
danger which has become evident in such situations as Cuba, where
effective control of the government was gained with relative ease
principally because that power was so narrowly dispersed. The damage
caused to political processes, where they may have existed previously,
has been assessed as even more undesirable and potentially explosive
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ion realistically assessed from the standpoint of increased
military participation and control in these governments, and the defi-
nitely limited guidance the United State Id provide (without being
asked), it has been felt that a propitious approach for this nation would
be that of Civic Action. That this nation should foster increased mili-
tary activity in politics has not been asserted. It has been felt that an
excess of this sort of activity has been, and will continue to be en-
countered irregardless of the established position of the United States.
Given such conditions, and the liklihood of their continuance in the
future, it has not been considered likely that this nation's interests
would be ill-served by providing the assistance necessary to allow the
military forces of the underdeveloped states to engage in Civic Action
programs. The United States Congress has shown its awareness of the
potential of such activities by this nation when it reported in 1962 that:
In many of the less developed societies the military officer
class is among the most enlightened and competent elements
of the population. And in the absence of stable and viable
political institutions in some of these countries, it is hardly
surprising that elements capable of leadership should grasp
it. At that point, the question turns on the quality and the
motivation of the leadership. . . . The Ambassadors and
their staffs should keep as closely in touch as possible with
the military training program. •***
U. , agress, Senate, Comrai' n Foreign Relations,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Report of Committee on S. 2996,
87th Cong., 2nd Sess. , rieport No. 1535 ( V ashingten: Government
Printing Office, 1962), p. 35.
i
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Bulldozers for tanks, engineers for military tacticians, village
wells for foxholes and trenches, and building implements for arms
could provide, where the change-over could be effected, a new sense
of direction for the military. The benefit derived from such activity
would be an increased degree of loyalty among the indigenous govern-
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the communists, since these have been the primary concern of the
United States. This \ has been engrossed in containing i
batting communist advances throughout the world by any means. Its
search for methods to counter unconventional warfare has not arisen
solely from, a desire to put an end to this form of conflict, but to st
it because the communists have now adopted it as a principal tact
in their expansionist eric s. It has become widely known and
accepted that not ail efforts in this direction have been communist in-
spired. Revolutionary activity in the underdeveloped states has
provided a unique opportunity for the communists, ver, and they
have not hesitated to exploit every conceivable opening available to
them for the purpose of maximizing their political gains in areas
made vulnerable by the disruptive tactic at guerrilla war.
The folly aging in more precisely defined forms
aggression, and the inherent dangers involved therein have been men-
ied previously (pp. 7-10, above). The unacceptable prospects of
other for ire, in addition to the existing conditions now pre-
valent throughout most of the underdeveloped world, have given a neu
impetus to the subversive, insurgent, an landestine method of
I
. Hostow, 'OuerriD rfare in the Underdeveloped /reas, "
in T. N. Greene, The Guerrilla and how to Fight Him (New York: . .
Praeger, 1962), pp. 54-55.
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unconventional warfare. The complete answer has not been wrapped
up in the nuclear phenomenon, and this fact has become ev re
apparent when the relationship between Civic Action and guerrilla war-
fare is understood.
Unconventional arfare and the Requirements of Counterinsurgency
The Chinese Communist leader, Tse-Tung, has been most
commonly referred to as the grand master of the art of unconventional
2
war. He has written extensively on the subject, and has more recently
been copied by many of the modern-day, recently arrived, "authorities"
5
in the same field.
\o*& treatises on guerrilla warfare have set forth certain pre-
cepts which might be considered inviolable if success in this kind of
war is to be expected. He repeatedly emphasized the necessity for
political goals, and indicated further that those goals must be in coin-
4
cidence with the desires of the people. To insure a proper relationship
between the political goals of the war and the people's wants, the re-
quirement for supervisors (cadres) and ample propaganda equipment
2
: nuel B. Griffith, Tung on Guerrilla arfare (New
York: F. \ Praeger, 1961).
3 Che Guevara, Guerrilla arfare (New York: 1 . . Praeger,
1961).





was deemed essential. The now-famous analogy of
Mao's which compared the masses to the waters of the sea, and 1
guerrillas as fish swimming therein has vividly accentuated the need
6
for a communion of these elements in this ty , ao strongly
criticised the traditionally Western
not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms. ' He
8
called such thinking M . . . simple minder
Particular emphasis was placed on the operation in the initial
stages, and the need for concentrating action on the exterior linec.
foothold must be gained, psychologically or militarily, and this could
best be accomplished in the peripheral areas where (in an under-
developed state) strong government support, ample protect ad
organized economic, political, and administrative machinery would
be least effective, or non-existent.
ost of the underdeveloped areas of the world have exhibited a
susceptibility for this type infiltration. emulation of most of
the prerequisites for a potentially successful guerrilla campaign, as
5
Ibid
. , p. 6 .
6












ordered in the communist philosophy, are found in these underdeveloped
states--a weak underdeve loped economy, national confusion, lack of a
meaningful national purpose throughout the masses, a weak govern-
ment, uneducated people clinging to the tribal society, and no effective
9balance in national political power.
The requirement for a co-operative civic-military relationship
in a counterinsurgency operation has been repeatedly stressed.
Popular support is indispensable to the guerrilla because
he is militarily weak, a fact easily forgotten, fitter ail,
the guerrilla fights as he does because he lacks the weapons
. . . and often numbers to fight in any other way. Seldom
if ever has anyone deliberately chosen a guerrilla strategy
when other choices existed. *®
It has also been sufficiently emphasised that the character of uncon-
ventional warfare has demanded more than a strictly military approach
to the problem (see pp. 54-57, above).
Approaches that unduly stress either military or non-
military action are the worst kinds of oversimplification,
though each may seem tempting when one has lost patience
with a more complex approach. Only by constantly recalling
the fundamental structure of guerrilla movements, and by
putting . . . theoretical distinctions into practice, can the
intricate but essential co-ordination of political and military
action be maintained toward ultimate success. H
9
James F. Cross, Conflict in the Shadows (New York: Doubleday
& Co., 1963), pp. 15-18.
10
Poter Paret and John W, Shy, "Guerrilla Warfare and U. 5.

















liat might be considered to be a co-ordinated balanr the
military and political action considered so essential in the above
statement ' Gerald Templer, the British leader who has been
credited with the particularly successful venture of the British in
laya against communist guerrillas there, has given some indication
as to what he considered proper balance. He stated that:
/er since the High Commissioner and I came here we have
known very well indeed that the shooting side of this affair
was only one-quarter of the trouble. The thing that really
matters is the other three-quarters. W« knew that we must
get at the hearts and minds of the people to condition against
this beastly communism. The way to do that is through
proper schooling, health, housing and social and political
advance generally.
The above statement was recorded as a successful leader's v.
as to how a guerrilla campaign might be defeated. / striking simi-
larity has been seen in the comparison of Tempter's statement a-
those previously quoted in this writing which have represer icial
U. S. policy in the field of Civic ::tion (pp. 43-44, abo\
Civic Action could be justified in terras of national strategy.
This nation has amassed a capacity for destruction which has been con-
sidered practically incomprehensible. The need for such a tremendous
killing capability has been justified in terms of relative strengths. It
12
Dr. Albert V. Burke, "The Foxy imperialist, " a, a
reprinted version of a television program of the same title presented
on KLZ-TV, Denver, Colorado, March 31, 1964.
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the political aims for which it was initially undertaken. Counter-
insurgency operations conducted to minimize or eradicate any
guerrilla threat have been relied upon to bring these explosive c
ditions under control. The problem has in no way been solved,
however, if no action is directed toward removing the source of the
discontent which originally gave rise to a guerrilla or other revo-
lutionary uprising. Civic Action, by whatever name, has been an
integral part of any successful counter-guerrilla operation. Where
the concept has shown its true potential has been in its applicability
in controlling or combatting those conditions upon which guerrilla
forces have initially fed, and gained momentum. It should be con-
sidered equally important as counterinsurgency, or complementary
to it in areas which could be classified as "active, " and of even
greater importance in fomenting and other "passive" areas.
13
E. 1* Katzenbach, Jr., "Time, Space, and Will: The
Politico- Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung, " in T. N. Greene (ed. ),
op. cit.
, p. 19.
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CONCLUSIONS
Tho ranks have closed. The opponent* of the United States for-
eign a mve become increasingly effective in their efforts
seriously curtail govern ading in this* vital area. Persistent
is by i have asserted that cutting the aiv
gram would be tantamount \g and abetting th. list c
*icy have only given t further indignation :ng
forces. If th^rfi ware si guarantee which c mi offe
I tars in (he nati
of the "c ^iiist conspiracy, M doubtless t inds v. oe appro-v
-ith all doe facility. Obvionaly, no such guaran
has been, nor shall be forthcoming. But what if it could be mad
ith world conditions a they ar ., an - been -inc*j the end
of the Second World War, could the United States i -ate aid and
contint. arcue its national objectives in a peaceful environ
In the nation- state i| all its inheren. nfiict
of gies v/^^1 be placed by conf >us nature.
tl within the un< >v
enhan. oart by th I of assistance, certainly cou
bo subdnt-o by the cessation of these programs.
li n has presenter prob) >f grave concern to the
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nation. The problem has not been contained solely in the conspiracy"
phenomenon, however; and the desirability for creating and develop-
ing conditions of stability and peace within these underdeveloped areas
has also shown some considerable degree of attractiveness. Foreign
aid, whether proffered from a. national, regional, or international
level, has become more of a necessity in any attempts to further these
conditions, especially if they are to be successful. The relative size
of an aid program, in terms of dollars needed, has not been of primary
concern in this thesis. There have been certain indications prevalent
in the polemics concerning the amount of aid the United States should
commit to such programs which have suggested that more
,
and not
less financial assistance would be warranted in the future. The more
obvious ones have been:
1. The population "explosion" and its net effect on the economic
growth in an underdeveloped nation. Development through self-help
and assistance has been subjected to the per-capita income growth
measurements, and in some areas, such as Latin America, the out-
look has been anything but favorable. That is not to say that more aid,
without further reforms internally, would alleviate the situation, but
neither has there been any evidence that less assistance would
improve conditions.
2. In many of the underdeveloped states, the process of develop-
ment and modernization has not yet reached what the economists have

'erred to as "the take-off stage. : with l«
nat oave reached the stage of more t pital
(the absorp; is inc
,. 1. 1 that greater demands mate . assistance
should be expected.
Itfe v ^sed trend indi that gucrril' .ias
proved its util >a the age erkiil, It should no: be surprising that
more assistance of a military and economic nature might be required.
To combat this menace from military, economic, political, and psy-
chological directions has proved to be an expensive undertaking.
ilitary assistance allocations have generally stabilized in recent
years, except in areas such as South Vietnam. The Congress has, in
effect, placed a ceiling on such spending, and it has not been felt that
the lid could be pushed much higher, barring unforeseen developments.
Military assistance increases to many of the underdeveloped could not
be justified in any event, It has not proved helpful to the interest of
the United States to maintain non-progressive minorities in power, when
that power has been drawn from the indigenous military support,
strengthened by United States arms assistance.
National power, without the support of the majority of the people,
has proved to be baseless and eventually the element which has been
successful in consolidating that support usually has prevailed. That
such support has been betrayed subsequent to a revolution has shown

m significance, ail t be«: *in
atrol through such ieir success has not been mad*
any leas attainable by Unitac State a assU stored the
.entration of polii. ;iands of a small minority,
re rsifled system of control within any country v,
fa successful rgani a,
such as the c ..mists.
mi Civi. >t has revealec vantages
when viewed as an instrument of foreign aid policy I fcat been aimed
at the realistic level of prcgrs
programs associated with a Civi approach have been directed
toward the remote areas of troubled nations. Ihey have to some degree
lessened the "overshoot" characteristic of orthodox economic anc
tary assi a, where large more costly projects have
been t -*mong the leading element- I le recipient
states. Civic Action has been desL fully uti is latent
potential c.f the indigenous military establishments, whore otherwise
these forces woul un-., ->ubtediy q eoattoua Itute a se.
ami economic power, with little or no return in realistic
: benefits.
Civic Action ha& shown advantages in other ways in countries
t ar©qui site & enting sue sn
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1. The modernisation process has been started at the bottom, in
the local community with relatively email, inexpensive, tangible bene-
fit-producing projects, where it should be started.
2. It has provided a means whereby national concern for remote,
insurgency-ridden areas might be aided and protected--such conditions
having been considered essential in maintaining any degree of national
control.
3. Properly implemented, Civic Action would assist in creating
and further developing a sense of nationhood- -a condition found to be
seriously lacking among the states in the underdeveloped world. Parti*
cipation in programs of Civic Action by the military has often provided
an identifying factor for the masses in these areas where no other
such instrument has existed effectively.
4. States have always had military establishments. These forces,
through their participation in Civic /ction, have proved to be an
important by-product of the military- Civic Action relationship. The
men involved in these operations have gained valuable training. It
would be expected that, upon their return to civilian life, with proper
background indoctrination in such operations, and a hopefully broadened
education and outlook, however basic, these groups might contribute
more to the national effort than they would with simply a knowledge of




Is the Civic Action concept a tool or a trap 1 It has, by the very
nature of its prime moving force--the military--required a tremendously
delicate balance to remain properly oriented. V ith inadequate control,
or through leadership not concerned for the pulse of the people, it could
yield results more volatile and repulsive than conditions as they have
generally existed in the underdeveloped world. In short, it has been
-side-red a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Given present
world conditions, and the need to face up to them in whatever small
way. Civic Action as an instrument of foreign aid has revealed a unique
attractiveness which has not yet been found in other approaches.
In the period of the next decade, with the growing resistance to
the foreign aid outlay, it has been considered essential that some
method be found which would be equivalent to that contained in the Civic
tion concept. It has become generally accepted that the world is
now less dangerous but more disorderly than it was a decade ago. How-
ever true this feeling may be, it is still a world which must be reckoned
with; and the United States stands to gain or lose in the future by its
position then, it is in the national interest that the nation make every
endeavor to foster within the underdeveloped states conditions of
stability and responsibility-^ task of such staggering dimensions that
it demands the use of every available resource from the United States
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